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TAX POLICY FOR POST-LIBERAL
SOCIETY: A FLAT-TAX-INSPIRED
REDEFINITION OF THE
PURPOSE AND IDEAL
STRUCTURE OF A PROGRESSIVE
INCOME TAX
CHARLES R. O'KELLEY, JR.*
A flat rate comprehensive federal income tax could be achieved by
replacing graduated rates with a single rate that applies to all taxpayers,
eliminating many currently available deductions and credits, and treating
as taxable income types of economic gain presently excluded from the tax
base.' The fact that Congress is seriously considering such radical
changes2 makes it appropriate for tax scholars to reconsider longheld be-
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Oregon. B.A. 1970, University of the South;
J.D. 1972, University of Texas at Austin; LL.M. 1977, Harvard University.
1. Congressional hearings and the introduction of a number of flat rate bills show wide sup-
port for a flat rate comprehensive income tax. See, ag., Flat Rate Tax Hearings Before the Senate
Comm. on Finance, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982) [hereinafter cited as Flat Tax Hearings]. For a brief
description of bills representing possible approaches to a flat rate comprehensive income tax, see id.,
pt.l, at 37-39 (testimony of Rudolf Penner, American Enterprise Institute). For survey data from
1982 indicating that Americans by a margin of better than two to one favor a flat rate comprehensive
income tax, see id., pt. 1, at 272- 73 (testimony of Louis Harris, Chairman, Louis Harris and Associ-
ates, Inc.). For the leading popular explanation and defense of a flat rate comprehensive tax, see R.
HALL & A. RABUSHKA, Low TAx, SIMPLE TAX, FLAT TAx 32-52 (1983). Nine flat rate compre-
hensive tax bills were introduced in 1983: S. 1421, H.R. 3271, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983); S. 557,
98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983); H.R. 3516, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983); H.R. 2520, 98th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1983); H.R. 2137, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983); H.R. 1770, 98th Cong., Ist Sess. (1983); H.R.
1664, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983); H.R. 542, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983); H.R. 170, 98th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1983). Twelve bills were introduced in 1982: S. 2887, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982); S. 2817,
H.R. 6944, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982); S. 2376, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982); S. 2200, 97th Cong.,
2d Sess. (1982); S. 2147, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982); H.R. 6741, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982); H.R.
6628, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982); H.R. 6352, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982); H.R. 6070, 97th Cong.,
2d Sess. (1982); H.R. 5868, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982); H.R. 5513, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982);
H.R. 4821, 97th Cong., 2d Seas. (1982).
2. For a suggestion that these radical changes are foreshadowed by recent legislation, see
Graetz, The 1982 Minimum Tax Amendments as a First Step in the Transition to a "Flat- Rate" Tax,
56 S. CAL. L. REv. 527, 550-54 (1983).
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liefs about the ideal structure of an income tax.' This Article analyzes
the characteristics and underlying rationale of a progressive flat rate
comprehensive income tax and reconsiders the nature and purpose of a
progressive income tax.
Part I of this Article describes how adopting a flat rate comprehen-
sive income tax that uses a personal exemption could result in tax bur-
dens substantially more progressive than occur under the current system.
Part II explores the nature of individual entitlement to income in our
post-liberal society and the purpose of the income tax. In addition, Part
II presents an argument for a personal exemption equal in amount to the
minimum wage. Part III examines the proper role of shared living ar-
rangements in determining tax liability and concludes that a flat rate
comprehensive income tax, properly designed and understood, produces
appropriate tax burdens for both married and unmarried individuals.
Part IV develops a case for integration of the income tax and the social
security system, which builds on the argument for linking the personal
exemption to the minimum wage.
I. THE FLAT RATE COMPREHENSIVE INCOME TAX AND
PROGRESSIVITY
Viewed from the standpoint of horizontal equity,4 simplicity,' and
3. Mainstream scholars have traditionally favored a progressive tax imposed on a comprehen-
sive tax base. The leading work supporting this view is H. SIMONS, PERSONAL INCOME TAXATION
(1938). For more recent debates concerning the comprehensive tax base ideal, see Bittker, Compre-
hensive Income Taxation: A Response, 81 HARv. L. REv. 1032 (1968); Bittker, A Comprehensive
Tax Base as a Goal of Income Tax Reform, 80 HARV. L. REV. 925 (1967); Bossons, The Value of a
Comprehensive Tax Base as a Tax Reform Goal, 13 J. LAW & EcON. 327 (1970); Galvin, More on
Boris Bittker and the Comprehensive Tax Baser The Practicalities of Tax Reform and the ABA's
CSTR, 81 HARV. L. REV. 1016 (1968); Musgrave, In Defense of an Income Concept, 81 HARV. L.
REV. 44 (1967); Pechman, Comprehensive Income Taxation: A Comment, 81 HARV. L. REV. 63
(1967). For the most thorough review of the case for progressivity, see W. BLUM & H. KALVEN,
THE UNEASY CASE FOR PROGRESSIVE TAXATION (1953).
4. Horizontal equity exists when similarly situated taxpayers bear similar tax burdens. Un-
like the current income tax, a comprehensive tax base would not treat one taxpayer's income differ-
ently from another's based on its source. Furthermore, the comprehensive tax base would not favor
certain uses of income, such as charitable contributions or housing expenditures, over other uses. If,
as is generally believed, the source and the use of income are irrelevant factors in determining the
relative tax burdens of taxpayers, a more comprehensive tax base is preferable to the existing system.
5. A complex tax is expensive to administer and difficult to understand. The degree of struc-
tural complexity determines how much difficulty the ordinary taxpayer will have in filling out a
return. If a more comprehensive tax base were instituted by eliminating most currently allowed
deductions, the structural complexity would be greatly reduced and taxpayers would spend less time
and money computing and reporting their taxes. Moreover, there would be fewer opportunities for
taxpayers to take advantage of loopholes or uncertainties in the tax structure. This would reduce the
need for regulatory and enforcement activities. However, a truly comprehensive tax base that rigor-
[Vol. 58:727
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the productivity of our national economy,6 a flat rate comprehensive in-
come tax seems preferable to our current income tax. Assessed in terms
of vertical equity-the requirement that individuals who are not simi-
larly situated should bear fair relative tax burdens-the case for a flat
rate tax appears less convincing. However, the vertical equity issue is not
whether the income tax should extract a proportional amount of each
taxpayer's income or instead, whether it should be progressive and take
an increasing percentage of income as income increases. This is so be-
cause there is tacit agreement, even among supporters of a flat rate tax,
that the income tax should be progressive. Most advocates of a flat rate
tax favor or accept the inevitability of a personal exemption-a deduc-
tion from gross income shielding a fixed amount of each taxpayer's in-
come from taxation.7 Introducing a personal exemption into a flat rate
system makes an income tax progressive.8
For example, consider A, B, and C, individuals who have compre-
hensive annual incomes of $10,000, $25,000, and $50,000, respectively.
A 20% flat rate comprehensive tax allowing no personal exemption
would take the same percentage of A's, B's, and Cs incomes and would
not be progressive. However, if a $5,000 personal exemption is intro-
duced, then the effective rate of tax9 for A, B, and C, respectively, is 10%,
16%, and 18%. If a $10,000 personal exemption is introduced instead,
ously sought to include in income all employee fringe benefits, unrealized gain on capital assets, and
imputed rental income from owner-occupied or owner-used capital goods, would substitute a large
amount of complexity for that eliminated. Perhaps this is why none of the bills before Congress seeks
to do more than eliminate current deductions and exclusions. Flat Tax Hearings, supra note 1, pt. 1,
at 37-39. Even if the tax base were not made more comprehensive, introduction of a fiat rate might
substantially reduce the number of transactions entered into, and the number of aggressive reporting
positions taken, solely to avoid the impact of high marginal tax rates. This would reduce the cost of
administering and enforcing the tax. See R. HALL & A. RABUSHKA, supra note 1, at 2-14.
6. As marginal tax rates increase, the relative cost of work versus leisure increases. The rela-
tive cost of present consumption versus saving for future consumption also increases. Empirical
studies suggest that greater amounts of work and investment would result under a flat rate tax than
under a graduated rate tax. Flat Tax Hearings, supra note 1, pt. 1, at 179-80 (statement of John E.
Chapoton, Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for Tax Policy). Moreover, the combination of high
marginal rates and deductions that would be eliminated in a more comprehensive tax base, for exam-
ple, the capital gains deduction and percentage depletion, funnel resources into less productive uses.
See R. HALL & A. RABUSHKA, supra note 1, at 53-60.
7. All of the bills introduced in the 97th Congress provide a personal exemption, or a tax
credit performing the same function, in amounts ranging from $1,000 in H.R. 4821, 97th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1982), to $17,500 in S. 2557, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982). See also R. HALL & A. RABUSHKA,
supra note 1, at 35, 121.
8. For the best discussion of this point, see W. BLUM & H. KALVEN, supra note 3, at 4, 90-
100.
9. The effective rate of tax is obtained by dividing the tax paid by the comprehensive income.
In other words, the effective rate is the rate of tax that would generate the actual tax paid if no
deductions were allowed.
HeinOnline -- 58 S. Cal. L. Rev. 729 1985
SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 58:727
then the effective rate of tax for A, B, and C, respectively, is 0.0%, 12%,
and 16%. Thus, a flat rate tax using a personal exemption is progressive,
with the degree of progressivity increasing as the amount of the personal
exemption increases.
The vertical equity issue then becomes a matter of determining the
preferable type of progressivity. The answer to this question requires an
understanding of the different types of progressivity that result from flat
rate and graduated rate structures. The difference can be illustrated by
again considering A, B, and C, individuals who have comprehensive in-
comes of $10,000, $25,000, and $50,000. These individuals may be
thought of as representatives of the lower, middle, and upper income
classes. Chart I shows their relative tax burdens and after-tax incomes
under a 20% flat rate comprehensive income tax. It also shows their bur-
dens under a graduated rate comprehensive income tax that extracts 5%
of the first $10,000 of taxable income, 35% of taxable income between
$10,000 and $30,000, and 60% of taxable income in excess of $30,000.
Both tax schemes allow a $5,000 personal exemption, but no other
deductions.
CHART I
After-Tax After-Tax
Gross Taxable Tax Tax Income Income
Taxpayer Income Income (Flat Ratea) (Graduated Ratesb) (Flat Rate) (Graduated Rates)
A $10,000 $5,000 $1,000 $ 250 $9,000 $9,750
B 25,000 20,000 4,000 4,000 21,000 21,000
C 50,000 45,000 9,000 16,500 41,000 33,500
a. 20% of taxable income.
b. 5% of first $10,000 of taxable income; 35% of taxable income between $10,000 and $30,000;
60% of taxable income in excess of $30,000.
Chart I shows that if the amount of the personal exemption and the
revenue needs of government are assumed to be equal under either rate
structure, then a graduated rate system will always extract less tax from
the lower class and more tax from the upper class than will a flat rate tax.
Moreover, a flat rate tax, unlike a graduated tax, will not take a substan-
tially larger share of income from the upper class than it did from the
middle class. In other words, under the stated conditions, a graduated
tax will reduce the pretax inequality in income between the upper and
middle classes and between the upper and lower classes to a greater ex-
tent than will a flat rate tax.
This analysis may present a false picture for two reasons. First, it is
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premised on the belief that the political process will produce the same
personal exemption under a flat rate tax as under a graduated tax. How-
ever, when considering a flat rate tax in which the personal exemption is
the only progressive element, Congress may adopt a larger personal ex-
emption than would be politically feasible under a graduated rate tax.
Second, the analysis presupposes that the progressivity effects of a gradu-
ated rate comprehensive income tax are relevant to the vertical equity
issue."0 A comprehensive tax base has been advocated by scholars, the
American Bar Association, and the Treasury" without any success,
probably because the resulting tax would be too progressive. It may be,
then, that a more comprehensive tax base can be achieved only by chang-
ing from graduated to flat rates. 2 If this is so, then the proper compara-
tor for any proposed flat rate comprehensive tax is not a theoretical
graduated rate comprehensive tax, but, instead, the existing income tax,
which is riddled with loopholes and exclusions and is considerably less
progressive than its ideal version.
Chart II compares the progressivity of the present income tax' 3 and
three possible versions of a flat rate comprehensive income tax. Plans A,
B, and C allow personal exemptions of $5,000, $10,000, and $20,000,
respectively, and extract tax from resulting taxable incomes at the rate of
10. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
11. See U.S. DEP'T OF TREASURY, BLUEPRINTS FOR BASIc TAX REFORM 3-8 (1977) [herein-
after cited as BLUEPRINTS]; Graetz, supra note 2, at 529-30.
12. A comprehensive tax base would increase the tax burden of the wealthy relative to others.
Flat Tax Hearings, supra note 1, pt. 2, at 10 (statement of Joseph A. Pechman, Director of Economic
Studies & John K. Scholz, Research Assistant, Brookings Institution). This detriment could be
offset by the substitution of a flat rate for the present graduated rates. In the minds of members of
Congress subject to re-election pressures, any drastic change in the present system would have to be
offset in some way so that no substantial number of taxpayers would feel aggrieved. Typical are the
comments of Senator Dole, Chairman of the Senate Finance Committee:
Let's take mortgage interest .... There will have to be some transition rules, or you
would have to demonstrate that in our proposal or whichever proposal we might seriously
look at, that assuming the deduction was denied, that you still had a better deal because of
the lower rate.
Flat Tax Hearings, supra note 1, pt. 1, at 127.
13. The effective tax rates under present law displayed in Chart II are interpolated from data
set forth in Table 8 of a statement prepared for the Senate Finance Committee, Flat Tax Hearings,
supra note 1, pt. 2, at 25 (statement of Joseph A. Pechman, Director of Economic Studies & John K.
Scholz, Research Assistant, Brookings Institute). Comprehensive income in that study is:
adjusted gross income as defined in the Internal Revenue Code modified to include sick
pay, all savers interest, nonitemizers charitable contributions, excludable dividends, inter-
est on life insurance, excluded capital gains, all unemployment benefits, state and local
bond interest, 50 percent of social security benefits, workman's compensation, veterans
payments, tax preferences reported on the minimum tax form, one-third of employer pro-
vided life insurance, employer provided life insurance, 1981 IRA provision rescinded.
Id., pt. 2, at 23.
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15%, 25%, and 40%, respectively. 14 All taxpayers are assumed to be
single, living alone, without dependents.' 5
CHART II
Effective Tax Rates
Comprehensive
Income Present Lawa Plan Ab  Plan Bc Plan Cd
$ 5,000 2.35% 0% 0% 0%
10,000 5.00 7.50 0 0
20,000 8.40 11.25 12.50 0
30,000 10.00 12.50 16.67 13.33
50,000 12.63 13.50 20.00 24.00
100,000 16.34 14.25 22.50 32.00
300,000 23.00 14.75 24.17 37.33
750,000 26.40 14.90 24.67 38.93
a. Effective tax rate under 1984 law.
1 6
b. 15% of comprehensive income less $5,000 personal exemption.
c. 25% of comprehensive income less $10,000 personal exemption.
d. 40% of comprehensive income less $20,000 personal exemption.
Chart I reveals the strikingly different distributions of tax burdens
possible under the four structures. To test the relative progressivity of
these structures, I postulate that one tax is more progressive than an-
other if it imposes a greater tax burden on higher income citizens and a
lesser tax burden on lower income citizens than does the comparator tax.
Under this premise, Plan C is substantially more progressive than present
law. Moreover, Plan C is more progressive than Plans A or B, and Plan
B is more progressive than Plan A. 7 However, whether Plan A and
Plan B are more or less progressive than present law is not immediately
clear.
14. The hypothetical rates are the result of an intuitive, partially informed guess about the
rates necessary to produce current revenues, under a more comprehensive definition of income with
the suggested personal exemption. Plan A seems consistent with the assertion of a Treasury Depart-
ment official that current revenues could be raised by using a rate of 16% and a $5,000 personal
exemption for a family of four. Plan B seems consistent with the same official's assertion that cur-
rent revenues could also be raised by using a rate of 20% and a $10,000 personal exemption. Flat
Tax Hearings, supra note 1, pt. 1, at 159 (statement of John E. Chapoton, Assistant Secretary for
Tax Policy, Dep't of the Treasury). Plan C is purely a guess.
15. This assumption defers the problem of proper allocation of tax burdens among individuals
with different lifestyles. See infra notes 70-105 and accompanying text.
16. See supra note 12.
17. This is necessarily true since the degree of progressivity is a function of the level of the
personal exemption.
[Vol. 58:727
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Under Plan A, the least advantaged citizens-individuals with in-
comes of $5,000 or less-and the most advantaged citizens-individuals
with incomes of $100,000 or more-are taxed more favorably than under
present law. 8 On the other hand, Plan A favors individuals with in-
comes from $10,000 to $50,000 less favorably than does the present law.
If one's primary motivation is a concern for the least advantaged, then
Plan A might be preferred to present law. However, individuals with
incomes between $5,000 and $10,000-disfavored under Plan A-might
properly be considered members of the least advantaged group. More-
over, the most advantaged citizens' tax burdens are significantly reduced
under Plan A. Accordingly, most advocates of progressivity would con-
clude that a permanent substitution of Plan A for present law would not
be a positive step.
Both Plan B and Plan C are more progressive than the present law.
For individuals with incomes over $300,000, tax burdens would be
slightly lower under Plan B than under present law; for individuals with
incomes under $10,000, tax burdens would be substantially lower under
Plan B than under present law. As a result, many scholars favoring a
progressive tax would be willing to replace present law with Plan B.
Under Plan C, the lower income class that fares better than under pres-
ent law is expanded further, and the burden imposed on higher income
taxpayers relative to present law is significantly increased. Presumably
Plan C would be favored over present law by most progressive tax schol-
ars and citizens.
Suppose, however, that Congress would seriously consider only Plan
A. It might seem obvious that progressive tax scholars and citizens-
those who favor a more equal distribution of society's consumable goods,
and particularly those who favor a greater distributive share for lower
income taxpayers-should fight against the adoption of Plan A and con-
tinue to advocate progressive changes to the existing graduated tax. In-
cremental progressive change is unlikely, however, due to the structural
complexity of our present income tax. 19 Structural complexity makes it
18. For purposes of the textual discussion of Chart II, it is unnecessary to define more precisely
the break-even points at which individuals would be favored or disfavored by the substitution of Plan
A, B, or C for present law. Instead, the important point is the relative treatment of lower, middle,
and upper income taxpayers, loosely defined, under each alternative. If greater accuracy were neces-
sary, it would appear, for instance, that the least advantaged group favored under Plan A would
include individuals with incomes slightly above the personal exemption, who would also pay less tax
under Plan A than under present law.
19. The history of income tax reform supports this point. Despite a number of striking changes
in the code between 1946 and 1976 (for example, the minimum tax and the change from single filing
to multiple rate structures) the effective rates of tax on inflation-adjusted income classes and between
1985]
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impossible for the nonexpert to understand exactly who is favored or
disfavored by the present tax code. Moreover, because each code provi-
sion or administrative procedure that authorizes a deviation from a com-
prehensive tax base has its own policy rationale, each deviation must be
evaluated in light of that particular policy. The basic question of the
relative tax burden to be borne by low and high income taxpayers is ob-
scured by these policy rationales and by the structural complexity.
Additionally, graduated rates divide taxpayers into income sub-
classes, each subject to taxation at different rates.20 Members of each in-
come subclass have a direct interest in reducing the rates to which they
are subject, but have no direct interest in the rate structure applicable to
other income subclasses. As a result, the tax burdens that the existing
structure produces do not promote solidarity among lower income tax-
payers. Instead, lower income taxpayers see the present income tax as an
incomprehensible monolith whose sole purpose is to generate revenues
for government bureaucracies. Discontent with the present system,
therefore, does not manifest itself in the form of coherent demands or
support for incremental progressive reform, but instead results in cross-
class sentiment that taxes are too high and should be cut across the
board.
Therefore, even if initially less progressive, a flat rate comprehensive
income tax may be preferable to our present system because it requires a
political and societal focus on only two items-the level of the personal
exemption and the rate of tax. Under a comprehensive flat rate tax, the
personal exemption divides society into two clearly identifiable economic
classes-those with comprehensive incomes at or below the personal ex-
emption who pay no tax, and those with comprehensive incomes above
the personal exemption. Individuals with incomes below, equal to, or
slightly above the personal exemption might eventually perceive their
common interest and support increases in the level of the personal ex-
emption. Accordingly, Congress might be persuaded over a period of
time to increase the personal exemption, and thereby make the income
tax substantially more progressive than the present tax.2 1
married and single taxpayers has changed very little. See Cohen, Reflections on the US. Progressive
Income Tax: Its Past and Present, 62 VA. L. REV. 1317, 1326 (1976). There is thus no historical
basis for assuming that some latent progressive tendency in the present income tax will soon mani-
fest itself.
20. For example, married couples are divided into 16 rate classes. I.R.C, § l(a) (1982).
21. Under this view a true flat rate tax would also be preferable to the Bradley-Gephardt Bill,
S. 2817, H.R. 6944, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982), and to similar bills. Bradley- Gephardt proposes a
more comprehensive tax base, a flat rate of 14%, and then graduated surtaxes from 6% to 14% on
adjusted gross incomes above $25,000 for individuals and the same surtaxes on adjusted gross in-
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Implicit in the suggestion that a flat rate tax may be the better mech-
anism for achieving a more progressive income tax is a particular view of
social and political reality. Most of us believe that needed change can be
obtained by peaceful means.2" Therefore, we must believe that the legisla-
tive process works in a principled manner. We assume that Senators and
Representatives enact legislation that a majority of citizens strongly de-
mand. Moreover, we believe that citizens will not strongly or in great
numbers press for personally advantageous legislation absent a firm belief
that they are entitled to the advantage in question. Nor will Congress
enact or preserve legislation that citizens strongly believe to be unjust.
For example, Congress could not be persuaded to exempt from the in-
come tax all married persons or all individuals occupying top-level posi-
tions in major American corporations. Nor would a significant number
of married individuals or corporate executives support such legislation.
The hypothetical proposals are not in response to any societally recog-
nized entitlement, and would be widely viewed as unjust.
It follows, then, that merely educating lower income taxpayers
about the economic benefits to them of a progressive fiat rate tax will not
generate strong support for its enactment. Moreover, even a progressive
Congress will not be moved to act by a scholarly explanation of the ad-
vantages of a progressive fiat rate tax.23 Instead, a governing majority of
Senators, Representatives, and citizens can be mobilized in favor of a
progressive flat rate tax only if they can be convinced that the resulting
after-tax incomes would be just, or at least significantly more just than
the distribution of after-tax income under present law. Crucial, then, to
an evaluation of the political viability and proper structure of a progres-
sive flat rate tax is an understanding of what citizens perceive to be just.
II. ENTITLEMENT-BASED ARGUMENTS FOR A
PROGRESSIVE FLAT RATE INCOME TAX
A. ENTITLEMENT TO AFTER-TAX INCOME
Individuals derive their notions of personal entitlement to property,
social status, and political rights from life experiences. Moreover, in a
comes in excess of $40,000 for married couples. Bradley-Gephardt and similar bills require a polit-
ical focus on a number of provisions, diverting attention away from the basic issue of the relative tax
burdens to be borne by lower income and upper income taxpayers.
22. Indeed it can be argued that only through peaceful means can fundamental needed change
be achieved. On this point, see Baker, The Process of Change and the Liberty Theory of the First
Amendment, 55 S. CAL. L. REV. 293, 316-21 (1981).
23. Put more broadly, much of tax scholarship is probably utopian in that it advocates changes
1985]
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relatively stable society such as ours there is widespread societal agree-
ment about the extent and nature of these entitlements. This agreement
is reflected in a governing ideological rationale-a set of beliefs justifying
the existing distribution of rights and privileges.24 The governing ideol-
ogy constitutes a set of rules on which the vast majority of citizens of
every class25 rely to justify advantages they gain, and against which they
measure the legitimacy of the advantages conferred on other citizens.26
These rules explain the conditions under which most citizens feel no
moral right to seize, or demand the seizure of, the income or property of
more advantaged citizens, or to resist the taxes imposed on their own
income or property. Fundamental to an understanding of this governing
ideology, I suggest, is the fact that ours is a post-liberal society27 charac-
terized by a tension between the dominant mode of thought and value,
termed liberalism or individualism, 28 and a subordinate perspective,
termed altruism or communitarianism.2 9 The governing ideology reflects
that seem to be required by abstract maxims of efficiency or justice, but these changes would produce
tax consequences inconsistent with the actual beliefs of a governing majority of citizens.
24. For a description of the nature of a governing ideology and its relationship to politics, see
R. UNGER, KNOWLEDGE AND POLITIcS 253-59 (1975).
25. For statistical evidence that the governing rules are the same for citizens of all economic
and social classes, see R. COUGHLIN, IDEOLOGY, PUBLIC OPINION AND WELFARE POLICY 34-44
(1980). Coughlin did, however, find greater support for government intervention in lower socio-
economic groups.
26. Of course, the existence of shared values and beliefs may not reflect universal human na-
ture, but instead the dominance of one class. See R. UNGER, supra note 24, at 243.
27. The term "post-liberal society" is from R. UNGER, LAW IN MODERN SOCIETY 192-93
(1976).
28. By individualism or liberalism I mean the governing rationale of a society using the institu-
tions of private property and a "free" market wherein each individual has the right and the desire to
use natural and acquired talents to achieve maximum material benefit. Individualism places para-
mount importance on individual autonomy, on the responsibility of the individual for his or her
situation, and on the virtue of the pursuit of individual self-interest. The view that temporarily or
permanently unemployed persons are the responsibility of private charity is a fundamental example
of the general theorems of individualism applied to a particular situation. For a detailed description
of individualism, see Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV.
1685, 1713-16 (1976).
29. By communitarianism I mean the governing rationale of a social system in which individ-
ual talents are viewed as assets of the community and individual catastrophes as responsibilities of
the community. In an ideal communitarian system unemployment would not be seen as primarily
the result of individual failings. Instead, unemployment would be understood as primarily a com-
munity defect, to be best remedied by the community as a whole rather than left to individuals, the
market, or private charity. Communitarianism thus places paramount importance on shared values
and communal responsibility for the well- being of citizens. The paramount virtue is not the pursuit
of self-interest, but the pursuit of the well-being of the individual understood as an integral part of
the community. While individualists believe that the maximum well-being of society will result indi-
rectly from the direct individual pursuit of narrow self-interest, communitarians contend that maxi-
mum individual weli-being is a necessary coproduct of, and is indivisibly linked to, the direct pursuit
of community well-being. For a detailed analysis of the ideal of community, see R. UNGER, supra
note 24, at 249-76; Kennedy, supra note 28, at 1717-22, 1771-74.
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society's ongoing attempt to accommodate these conflicting value sys-
tems and to legitimate and reconcile the related life experiences.
For post-liberal citizens, society is a cooperative venture for mutual
advantage3 ° in which the pursuit of ever greater levels of material well-
being is a paramount, almost biologically compelled, life goal.31 From
one perspective most citizens would describe their working lives as a con-
stant struggle with other workers, each pursuing his or her own narrow
self-interest, in order to obtain larger or more secure shares of goods and
services. At the same time, citizens realize that working in cooperation
with others permits a division of labor so that each worker may become a
specialist rather than a less efficient generalist. While specialization in-
creases each worker's output, it makes each worker dependent both on
goods and services produced by others, and on a market for the special-
ist's own product. Accordingly, post-liberal citizens understand that the
level of their own material well-being is inextricably linked with the sta-
tus of the national economy. For their own distributive share of goods
and services to be maximized, the total social product32 also must be
maximized. Moreover, most citizens view material rewards as the reason
for working and assume that the amount of goods produced by other
citizens will be maximized by allowing them to pursue their own narrow
self-interest. Thus, the competitive, materialistic life experiences of post-
liberal citizens lead them to believe that the role of government should be
limited to protecting private property and the workings of the free mar-
ket so that individuals can with security and certainty calculate and pur-
sue their own self-interest.
Post-liberal society is characterized by partial rejection of this indi-
vidualist, laissez faire model. While individuals view competition and
the pursuit of self-interest as a reality and a necessity, they also perceive
that success is often predicated on market or bureaucratic imperfection,
chance, or callous personal actions that would not be tolerated in a
nonmarket or nonhierarchical relationship. Moreover, within the family
and with friends, self-interest frequently yields to other human instincts.
In these relationships individuals develop and nurture sympathy and
concern for the well-being of others. These experiences reinforce the
widely shared belief that a pure laissez faire system would produce intol-
erable individual and community suffering. Instead, it is felt, society
30. See J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 4-6 (1971).
31. H. MARCUSE, AN ESSAY ON LIBERATION 10-13 (1969).
32. The total social product is the total goods and services produced for personal consumption
during a given period.
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must be structured to insure a minimally acceptable level of individual
and community well-being. In achieving this goal, post-liberal citizens
expect their government to engage in "overt redistribution, regulation
and planning."33
Accordingly, communitarian concerns sometimes require that the
workings of the free market be supplemented or bypassed. For example,
society accepts responsibility for the well-being of its least advantaged
citizens and through transfer payments provides them with at least mini-
mally sufficient resources so that they can avoid abject poverty without
having to steal or beg.34 In addition, society provides public goods, such
as national defense and parks, to its citizens when the market cannot
efficiently provide such goods.
Citizens acknowledge that providing for the least advantaged and
financing public goods require government revenues and the levying of
taxes.35 Thus, post-liberal citizens recognize that their gross incomes are
subject to taxation, and that taxes can legitimately be extracted to the
extent of government's preclusive claim. Post-liberal citizens still, how-
ever, claim moral entitlement to their after-tax income.
From a limited perspective, entitlement to after-tax income can be
justified because it represents the reward that society has promised each
citizen for employing his or her skills and capital in ways valued by con-
sumers and in accordance with society's rules. If these claims were not
honored, society would be unable to function on a cooperative, voluntary
basis. The result would be reduced liberty, fewer goods and services, or
both. 36 Nonetheless, this justification alone is insufficient, for it provides
no guidance about the proper design of the income tax. Instead, it sug-
gests that any income tax is acceptable so long as the rules are made
public, thereby enabling citizens to take them into account when calcu-
lating their own self-interest. Such a value-neutral formulation obviously
33. R. UNGER, supra note 27, at 193.
34. The constant debate over the contours of public assistance programs centers on questions
of defining need and determining the most efficient method of providing aid. No one seriously ques-
tions our commitment to provide basic assistance to the truly needy.
35. Public goods are to the advantage of society as a whole, yet cannot be sold to the benefi-
ciaries. In part this is a free-rider problem. If we provide national defense, all will benefit even if
some refuse to "buy" their share of this public good. Social services for the needy may also be
thought of as a public good that all of us wish to have available, but that few of us would "buy"
when not needy and none of us could "buy" if we were needy. Thus, public goods must be financed
by tax revenues. See J. RAwLs, supra note 30, at 267-70.
36. On the importance of honoring claims to the social product acquired in accordance with
the rules of a well-ordered society, see id. at 310-15.
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provides no basis for choosing between a progressive flat rate tax, a grad-
uated tax, or any other alternative.
Under a value-neutral formulation the income tax is only a revenue-
raising device that, as a mere side effect, determines the amount of after-
tax income to which a citizen is morally entitled. I will argue, however,
that it is more consistent with the beliefs of post-liberal citizens to view
the income tax as a device whose unique purpose is to determine the
after-tax income to which citizens are morally entitled, and, further, that
post-liberal citizens are entitled to the net after-tax income that would be
produced by a progressive flat rate tax.
B. THE ARGUMENT FOR FLAT RATES
The entitlement-based argument for a progressive flat rate income
tax is derived from our ideological beliefs about the nature of society and
the rights and duties of citizens. The argument will be illustrated by
analyzing how post-liberal individuals, if drawn into a hypothetical
"state of nature," would organize a simple society. This hypothetical
will demonstrate how such a society might evolve into a complex society,
and the role that the income tax would play at various stages of
development.37
First, we shall consider a simple, pre-money society ("Nirvana")
composed of citizens who possess overlapping and equally valuable tal-
ents. Each citizen is capable of providing for his or her own needs.
Through cooperation, however, economies of scale and efficiencies from
the division of labor can be achieved. This will result in an increased
social product or a reduced amount of time spent working. Accordingly,
the citizens of Nirvana coordinate and combine their work effort to pro-
duce collectively selected consumer goods. In addition to consumer
goods, Nirvana needs certain public goods, such as roads, water, and
sanitation systems. Because Nirvana is a voluntary association of equally
37. This endeavor is analogous in some ways to Rawls' use of the original position device to
justify his difference principle. Id. at 118-83. Professor Nozick also uses a hypothetical state of
nature to justify certain libertarian principles of justice. See R. NozIcK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND
UTOPIA 277-94 (1974). I use a similar device, a hypothetical Nirvana, populated with post-liberal
individuals fully aware of the technological capacities and social realities of present society. My
purpose is to develop arguments and ideological myths that are congruent with, and appealing to,
the average citizen's sense of justice. Often I state broad ethical premises that may seem outlandish
and in need of substantial support and explanation. These premises, though, are not offered as a
higher truth. Instead, I view them as useful tools in determining the tax policy options that are
politically viable. On the problems that underlying assumptions pose for legal scholars, see Gordon,
Historicism in Legal Scholarship, 90 YALE L.J. 1017 (1981); Tushnet, Legal Scholarship: Its Causes
and Cure, 90 YALE L.J. 1205 (1981).
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talented individuals for mutual advantage, each citizen must be extended
equal rights, but also must accept equal responsibilities. Therefore,
membership in society is conditioned on an individual's agreeing to con-
tribute a collectively determined equal amount of time to the creation
and rendering of public goods and services.
For simplicity, assume that citizens have identical preferences for
work and for leisure, and that, pursuant to a collective decision, each
citizen spends thirty hours per week producing consumer goods and ten
hours per week producing public goods. The consumer goods produced
must be distributed in kind to each citizen. Because each citizen is au-
tonomous and cannot be forced to work, there is no just basis for requir-
ing a citizen to share the fruits of his or her labor with others. In other
words, a citizen is morally entitled to the consumer goods which he or
she creates during time not devoted to public service (hereinafter called
"private production time"). Thus, the total social product is divided in
accordance with a collective determination of the value of each citizen's
contribution, which in this case presumably results in an equal divison.3 8
Now assume that Nirvana elects to take the advantages of coopera-
tion one step further. It is decided that some citizens should specialize in
the provision of public goods and others in the production of goods for
private consumption, thereby increasing the efficiency by which both are
produced. Even though some individuals are no longer directly involved
in production for private consumption, their public sector work permits
other citizens to devote additional time to production of private goods.
Conversely, the increase in production of private goods due to the spe-
cialization of some workers permits other workers to devote their time to
the production of public goods. Of course private-goods production spe-
cialists remain subject to an underlying obligation to contribute a soci-
etally determined equal amount of time to the creation and rendering of
public goods and services (hereinafter called "public service time"), and a
part of their work time will continue to be public service time. There-
fore, private-goods production specialists have no moral claim to the
goods and services which they produce during public service time. These
consumer goods are divided among the public-goods production special-
ists because such goods represent the portion of the total social product
to which public-goods production specialists are morally entitled as com-
pensation for the private production time that they have devoted to the
production of public goods. Thus, each citizen receives the value of his
38. This assumes equally valuable or scarce talents, equal effort, and accurate valuation of
labor performed.
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or her contribution to the total social product, which is understood, how-
ever, as the value attributable to a citizen's private production time.
Now let us transform Nirvana into a society using money as the
medium of exchange. Nirvana contintues to collectively determine
which products are produced, the price of such products, and the value
of each citizen's contribution to the total social product. A, B, C, and D
are representatives of Nirvana's citizens. A specializes in the production
of public goods. B, C, and D produce goods for private consumption.
The contributions of A, B, C, and D continue to be valued equally. The
total value of consumer goods produced by B, C, and D-the total social
product39-- is $120,000. However, B, C, and D are collectively morally
entitled to only three-fourths of the total social product because one-
fourth of their work is public service time. Thus, Nirvana distributes to
A, B, C, and D gross incomes of $30,000 apiece, representing both the
value of their private production time and the value of their contribution
to the total social product.
In the versions of Nirvana sketched to this point, each citizen has a
moral claim to the entirety of his or her gross income because that
amount represents the citizen's contribution to the total social product.
If, however, we further transform Nirvana into a market society in which
prices and gross incomes are determined by consumer choices in the mar-
ket, rather than by collective decision, then the identity between gross
income and contribution to social product disappears and an income tax
will be required. In our market version of Nirvana we will assume that
the total value of consumer goods produced by B, C, and D remains
$120,000 and that A, B, C, and D will each receive net incomes of
$30,000, representing the value of their contributions.4' The market will
cause B, C, and D each to receive gross incomes of $40,000, incomes
which equal the market value of the goods and services each produced.
Thus, the gross incomes of B, C, and D include the value of both their
public service time and private production time. Assuming Nirvana val-
ues A's services as equal to B's, Cs, and D's, A, too, will receive a gross
income of $40,000.41 In order to pay A's salary, it will be necessary to
extract $10,000 in income tax from the gross incomes of A, B, C, and D.
39. Because public goods are freely distributed or available, the total social product is com-
prised only of those goods and services available for private ownership and consumption.
40. Again, this assumes equally valuable or scarce talents, equal effort, and accurate valuation,
now by the market instead of by collective political decision.
41. Note that public service workers also receive gross incomes that include payment for the
private production time foregone as well as the public service time that they are required to contrib-
ute, for which they are entitled to no additional portion of the total social product.
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In a noncentrally administered market society the purpose of an income
tax, then, is to extract from gross income the value of public service
time-the portion of gross income which in a centrally planned economy
would have been directly diverted to the public sector. Moreover, in
such a market society, it is after-tax income which equals contribution to
social product (represents the value of private production time), and,
therefore, it is after-tax income to which a citizen is morally entitled.
In order to satisfy the moral claims of its citizens to the product of
their private production time, Nirvana must use a flat rate comprehen-
sive income tax-in this case with a rate of 25%-to divert revenues to
the public sector. Each citizen was initially obligated to work ten hours
per week producing public goods. For increased efficiency, Nirvana's
private sector employees now allocate ten additional hours to their area
of primary responsibility, as, in effect, do public sector employees. The
gross money income received for work during public service time does
not belong to the recipient. Instead, this income is a proxy for the ten
hours of public service work required from each citizen, and must be
extracted in order to provide the funds to pay public sector workers.42
If one agrees that a flat rate tax is the preferred and just method for
raising revenues to finance public goods, the next step is to determine the
proper method of extracting revenue to be used for the benefit of society's
least advantaged citizens. Let us now add to Nirvana individual E, who
is unemployable. Nirvana, like our post-liberal society, recognizes a soci-
etal obligation to provide, at least minimally, for citizens like E. The
resulting safety net for the least advantaged is thought of as a public good
equally available to all citizens and therefore should be financed in the
42. Since all citizens work forty hours per week in Nirvana, a flat rate tax of 25% exactly
captures the value of each citizen's ten public service hours per week. If preferences for work as
opposed to leisure differed, then such a flat rate tax might arguably undertax the incomes of those
who work less than forty hours per week and overtax the incomes of those who work more than
forty hours per week. This concern can be answered in two ways. In the real world, most citizens
devote similar amounts of time to work. Moreover, it would be administratively impractical to de-
sign a tax that adjusted the tax burden according to hours worked. Thus, a flat rate tax, without
adjustment for over- and under-workers, is sufficiently close to the ideal to be acceptable. Further-
more, those who work less than forty hours per week arguably reap a correspondingly smaller ad-
vantage from participation in the cooperative venture for mutual advantage. As "part-time"
members, their public service time should be reduced. As to those who work more than forty hours
per week, it could be argued that they extract correspondingly greater advantage from the coopera-
tive venture, and should put in more public service time as compensation. If this is so, then a
person's public service obligation would be a set percentage of the total hours that the individual
chose to devote to the production of consumer goods. The money earned during these public service
hours would be a proxy for the public service time owed, and a flat rate tax would extract the value
of this public service time whether the person worked more or less than the average citizen.
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same way as other public goods. Central to post-liberal ideology is the
belief that none of us deserves our good or bad fortune or our starting
place in life. The founders of Nirvana would undoubtedly be concerned
about their own future well-being or that of their friends or descendants.
Because the identity of those who will be in need is unknowable in ad-
vance and is, ultimately, the result of chance or other morally arbitrary
factors, the original citizens would agree as a condition to membership to
devote an equal amount of time, as needed, to provide at least a minimal
amount of consumer goods and rehabilitative services to the least ad-
vantaged.43 On the conversion of Nirvana to a free market system, the
money income earned by its citizens in the hours otherwise required to be
spent providing goods and services for the least advantaged, stands as a
proxy for such public service hours and must be extracted via a flat rate
tax.
Now let us delete E from Nirvana and change the characteristics of
A, B, C, and D so that their contributions to the social product are accu-
rately, but unequally, valued. While A and B continue to receive gross
incomes of $40,000, C and D receive gross incomes of $50,000 and
$30,000, respectively. The total social product continues to be $120,000,
and $40,000 must be extracted to fund the public sector. Determining
how to extract this tax from a viewpoint of ad hoc fairness, we might
suggest that graduated rates be implemented so that C would bear a pro-
portionately greater burden than lower income citizens. However, we
have posited that the gross income of Nirvana's citizens accurately re-
flects the relative value of his or her contribution to the social product.
In effect, graduated rates would require that C devote more time than A,
B, or D to the production of public goods. This result is inconsistent
with individual liberty and might even cause C to reduce her work effort
in the future. In contrast, a flat rate tax recognizes the obligation of each
member of society to provide an equal amount of time and effort to the
production of public goods, and is consistent with the value that post-
43. The inhabitants of John Rawls' original position are self-interested individuals without
knowledge of what their actual stations in life will be. J. RAwLS, supra note 30, at 12. From this
position of ignorance, Rawls argues that these original citizens would adopt the difference principle,
allowing inequality, but only to the extent that the least advantaged were indirectly benefited, id., at
75, 78, either by expanded job markets or increased transfer payments. My account assumes an
original position inhabited by average post-liberal citizens, none presently unemployable, who are
forming a new community. I believe my account of Nirvana and its citizens' agreement to assume
some, but not total, responsibility for the economic well-being of least advantaged citizens, better
describes the actual sense of justice of post-liberal citizens than does Rawls. Indeed, Rawls' differ-
ence principle can be criticized as equally flawed if viewed as a vision of what society's sense of
justice should be, because it assumes that human beings are doomed forever to self-interested action.
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liberal citizens place on individual liberty and noninterference with the
pursuit of self-interest.'
C. THE ARGUMENT FOR A PERSONAL EXEMPTION EQUAL TO THE
MINIMUM WAGE
The personal exemption is a deduction that exempts a portion of
each individual's gross income from the tax base. If the personal exemp-
tion could be increased significantly from present levels, then less ad-
vantaged citizens would be entitled to greater shares of after-tax
income." However, in tax policy literature the personal exemption is
justified as a device to shield from tax only the amount of income re-
quired for a minimally acceptable level of subsistence.46 If this view re-
flects the actual beliefs of post-liberal citizens, then the progressivity
theoretically achievable with a substantial personal exemption cannot be
transformed into reality. In this Section, I argue that post-liberal beliefs
concerning entitlement to after-tax income suggest that the personal ex-
emption should be an amount of income equal to the minimum wage,
rather than an amount equal to the poverty level-the income required
for basic subsistence.
The mainstream argument for a poverty-level personal exemption is
founded on the maxim that taxes should be levied in accordance with
taxpayers' relative ability to pay tax.47 Applying this maxim, it seems
clear that an individual with no discretionary income should pay no tax,
but that every individual with discretionary income should pay at least
some tax. Accordingly, the personal exemption should be set at the pov-
44. This vision of society as a cooperative venture founded by autonomous individuals who
voluntarily accept limited responsibility for the well-being of less advantaged citizens is similar, then,
to Nozick's vision of the minimal state. See R. NozicK, supra note 37, at 3-146. Unlike Nozick's,
however, my vision assumes a shared concern for the well-being of others, which coexists with the
basic rights to personal autonomy recognized by Nozick. Under Nozick's vision, taxes extracted for
transfer payments constitute forced labor. Id. at 170. Under my vision, taxes extracted for transfer
payments and other public goods are no more than a proxy for the equal commitment to society that
every post-liberal citizen would gladly make if thrust back into a state of nature.
45. The present income tax allows each individual a $1000 personal exemption. I.R.C. § 151
(1982). Unmarried individuals are allowed an additional $2300 personal exemption because the first
$2300 of taxable income is subject to a zero rate. Id. § 1(c). Married individuals are collectively
extended an additional $3400 personal exemption because the first $3400 of their joint taxable in-
come is subject to a zero rate. Id. § l(a).
46. See, eg., R. GOODE, THE INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAx 215 (1976); L. SELTZER, THE PER-
SONAL ExEMPTIONS IN THE INCOME TAx 5, 6 (1968).
47. See BLUEPRINTS, supra note 11, at 8-9; Mieszkowski, The Choice of Tax Base: Consump-
tion versus Income Taxation, in FEDERAL TAX REFORM: MYTHS AND REALITIES 27 (M. Boskin ed.
1978).
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erty level to insure that taxes will be extracted only from discretionary
funds.
However, arguments based on the "ability to pay" maxim lack cred-
ibility and are unpersuasive because the maxim can be used to justify tax
policies which most citizens clearly would view as unjust. For example,
wealth is arguably a better measure of ability to pay than is income,
which suggests that a wealth tax should replace our income tax. More-
over, one could argue that the income tax should confiscate the entirety
of incomes in excess of, for example, $50,000, because to the extent of
such excess the taxpayer has greater ability to pay than those with lesser
incomes. Despite the asserted application of the "ability to pay" maxim
neither of these arguments is persuasive because both a wealth tax and a
confiscatory income tax are inconsistent with post-liberal beliefs about
personal entitlement to after-tax income.48 If an argument about the
proper level of the personal exemption is to be persuasive, it must be
based on the actual beliefs of post-liberal citizens.49
There is, of course, a communitarian concern in post-liberal society
for the well being of the least advantaged citizen that underlies our socie-
tal commitment to provide at least a minimal amount of income to each
citizen. If a personal exemption at the poverty level is to be justified, it is
by reference to this societal concern and the beliefs and values that un-
derlie it rather than to the "ability to pay" maxim. Moreover, viewed
from the perspective of society's commitment to provide minimally for
the least advantaged, a personal exemption at the poverty level has intui-
tive appeal.
To evaluate this justification for a poverty level personal exemption,
let us return to Nirvana. Assume that $5,000 is the amount of after-tax
income needed for basic subsistence, and that A, B, C, and D earn gross
incomes of $5,000, $6,300, $20,000, and $68,700, respectively. C repre-
sents the public sector, and thus Cs $20,000 gross income equals the
revenues that the income tax must raise. A 20% fiat rate comprehensive
income tax allowing no personal exemption will produce $20,000 in reve-
nue, but will reduce A's after-tax income to below the poverty level.5" To
prevent this result, Nirvana must either exempt A's gross income from
tax via a $5,000 personal exemption or provide a direct income subsidy
48. For most citizens wealth is no more than deferred consumption-after-tax income saved
for use at some later date. To extract taxes from the wealth of ordinary citizens would conflict with
the average citizen's sense of entitlement to after-tax income.
49. See supra notes 37-44 and accompanying text.
50. Nirvana's total taxable income is $100,000, and the total tax extracted at a 20% rate is
$20,000.
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to A in the amount necessary to leave A with an after-tax income of$5, 000. 51
If Nirvana uses the personal exemption mechanism and extends its
benefits only to A, then the tax rate must be increased to 21.05%. B's
tax burden will then be increased to $1,325, and B's after-tax income will
be $4,975-$25 below the minimally acceptable poverty level.5 2 As a
result, Nirvana must extend to B a personal exemption large enough to
prevent B's after-tax income from falling below $5,000, and in turn the
tax rate must be raised to extract from society's reduced aggregate taxa-
ble income the $20,000 needed for public goods. C and D are not entitled
to a personal exemption because their after-tax incomes are above the
$5,000 poverty level.53
If the personal exemption can only be justified as a deduction for
taxpayers whose after-tax income would otherwise fall below the poverty
level, then the across-the-board personal exemption in our present tax
must be viewed as an unwarranted tax preference for higher income tax-
payers to the extent that their incomes are shielded from tax. We are
also required to view the personal exemption as merely a device that pro-
vides welfare payments to those whose own services to society do not
produce a sufficient return-a perception that denigrates the worth of
lower income citizens.
Instead of accepting these conclusions, a better explanation of the
purpose and proper design of the personal exemption can be derived
from a consideration of the nature, purpose, and justification of the mini-
mum wage laws.54 To illustrate the argument let us change the charac-
teristics of Nirvana's citizens once again. A now represents the public
sector and earns $40,000 annually. B, C, and D have gross incomes of
51. Nirvana's citizens accept and view the obligation to make welfare payments at the poverty
level as a public good to be financed by requiring each working citizen to devote slightly more time
on a pro rata basis to the production of the required goods and services. See supra note 43 and
accompanying text. Thus, the increase in tax, made necessary by a personal exemption founded on
welfare principles, is justified as a proxy for the additional public service time that each nonsub-
sidized citizen must contribute to provide welfare assistance to the working poor.
52. Extending a personal exemption to A reduces Nirvana's total taxable income to $95,000.
Extracting tax at the rate of 21.05% yields the $20,000 needed for public goods, yet leaves A with
$5,000 in after-tax income.
53. A personal exemption allowed only to taxpayers who otherwise would have after-tax in-
comes below the poverty level is a type of disappearing exemption. See L. SELTZER, supra note 46,
at 10; Note, A Proposed Flexible Exemption for the Federal Income Tax, 18 STAN. L. Rnv. 1162
(1966).
54. By the minimum wage laws I mean the provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act of
1938, as amended, which require employers to pay a specified minimum wage to employees. 29
U.S.C. § 206 (1983).
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$10,000, $12,000, and $98,000, respectively. B works a forty-hour
week-the norm in Nirvana-and earns the minimum wage. If the mini-
mum wage laws were not in effect B's gross income would drop from
$10,000 to $5,000-the poverty level for Nirvana-and the earnings of A,
C, and D, collectively, would increase by $5,000. Thus, the minimum
wage is a redistributive mechanism55 that must be justified by reference
to the governing ideological rationale of post-liberal society.
The redistribution of income achieved by the minimum wage cannot
be justified on the same grounds as welfare payments to those who are
unable to work. Post-liberal society views nonworking citizens as enti-
tled to public assistance at the poverty level because of their status as
fellow human beings.56 However, the minimum wage mandates gross in-
comes in excess of the poverty level.57 Thus, post-liberal society per-
ceives a fundamental difference between workers and nonworkers. The
minimum wage is not viewed as an expression of societal sympathy or
communitarian solidarity. Instead, low income workers are viewed as
valuable participants in the cooperative venture for mutual advantage.
They are entitled to receive the minimum wage by virtue of their work.
As a general rule society functions as if the value of a citizen's con-
tribution to the social product is accurately measured by the gross in-
come that he or she receives.58 However, post-liberal society does not
have complete faith in the efficacy of the market or the public and private
sector bureaucracies. The market and bureaucratic measurement of each
individual's contribution to the social product is imperfect. In the case of
individuals whose skills are in overabundant supply, the market produces
an unfairly low valuation of their contribution to society. To avoid
charges of unfair competition with the private sector, the public sector
accepts this wage scale. The minimum wage, then, represents society's
judgment that the otherwise prevailing market and bureaucratic evalua-
55. See Kronman, Contract Law and Distributive Justice, 89 YALE L.J. 472, 473 (1980).
56. This view is recognized and reflected in Nirvana's agreement to make welfare payments to
those who through no fault of their own are below the poverty level.
57. See S. REP. No. 1487, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1966) ("It is imperative, if the act is to have
real meaning, that the minimum wage provide earnings above the proverty level.").
58. As a general principle we believe in consumer sovereignty. The "vote" of the consumer
best determines the value of things produced and of services provided. Ultimately this vote trans-
lates into each individual's gross income. This view finds an early expression in T. HOBBES, LEVIA-
THAN (M. Oakeshott ed. 1972). "The value of all things contracted for, is measured by the appetite
of the contractors: and therefore the just value is that which they be contented to give." Id. at 117.
For a more recent formulation, see M. FRIEDMAN & R. FRIEDMAN, FREE TO CHOOSE 13-24 (1980).
The belief that consumer sovereignty should determine the value of one's contribution to society is
implicit in J. RAwLs, supra note 30, particularly at 270-74, 310-14.
1985]
HeinOnline -- 58 S. Cal. L. Rev. 747 1985
SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 58:727
tion of minimum wage workers' contributions to society is unfairly low. 59
At this point a crucial judgment must be made. Should we view the
minimum wage as the true value of the minimum wage worker's services
or as the minimal claim against the social product to which the minimum
wage worker is entitled by virtue of his or her services? If one believes
that the actual value to society of the services rendered by low income
workers is greater than indicated by their gross incomes, then the second
view will seem preferable. It is clear that minimum wage laws are based
on an awareness that markets and bureaucracies unfairly evaluate the
contributions of individuals without scarce talents." Furthermore, mini-
mum wage laws are aimed at achieving at least a decent share of the
social product for lower income workers. Nothing in the legislative his-
tory, however, suggests that Congress views the minimum wage as a true
or accurate measure of services rendered. Instead, the debate over mini-
mum wage legislation has focused on the resulting burden placed on the
employer if the minimum wage is increased or the coverage of the mini-
mum wage laws expanded.6" It is fair to asssume that Congress is unwill-
ing to place American businesses at too great a competitive disadvantage
relative to businesses in countries with lower wages. Thus, the minimum
wage is a compromise intended to achieve the maximum well-being for
low income workers consistent with the realities of international eco-
nomic competition. The minimum wage, then, should be thought of as
the base claim against the total social product to which each minimum
wage worker is entitled. Accordingly, the personal exemption should
equal the annual earnings of a full-time minimum wage worker since this
represents an amount of after-tax income to which every worker is mor-
ally entitled.62
This point can be reached somewhat differently. Recall that in Nir-
vana each worker is morally entitled to the value of his or her contribu-
tion to the total social product available for sale on the market. In
addition, every worker is obligated to contribute equal amounts of time
59. Providing the protection of the minimum wage to the American worker has been an
important element in our national policy for almost 30 years. Underlying this policy has
been the recognition that some segments of our labor markets work imperfectly and that
many workers are at a disadvantage in bargaining with their employers.
S. REP. No. 1487, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 18 (1966).
60. Id.
61. See H.R. REP. No. 2182, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. 15 (1938) ("[Minimum wages. . . shall be
as nearly adequate as is economically feasible without curtailing opportunity for employment, to
maintain a minimum standard of living necessary for health, efficiency, and general well-being.").
62. When I refer to the minimum wage, or to a personal exemption equal to the minimum
wage, I mean an amount equal to the annual earnings of an individual working the average work
week, and receiving 52 weeks' pay calculated at the minimum wage.
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for the production of public goods and services. If Nirvana encourages
the division of labor between and within the public and private sectors
and uses money as the medium of exchange, then the tax extracted by a
comprehensive flat rate income tax operates as a proxy for the public
service time owed by each citizen, and the after-tax income represents the
value of the citizen's contribution to the social product.63 In effect, the
minimum wage constitutes society's judgment as to the minimum real
value of any worker's contribution to the production of private goods.
The value of a minimum wage worker's public service time, therefore,
must be viewed as distributed by the market among those citizens whose
gross incomes exceed the minimum wage. As the income tax extracted
from gross income constitutes a proxy for the public service time owed to
society, the income tax can properly be extracted only from the portion
of gross income which exceeds the minimum wage.
To better understand the rationale of an across-the-board personal
exemption equal to the minimum wage, let us explore an alternative sys-
tem. Consider A, B, C, and D, individuals whose actual market incomes
are $40,000, $10,000, $16,000, and $94,000, respectively. A represents
the public sector. Accordingly, $40,000 in tax revenue must be gener-
ated. Nirvana's total gross income is $160,000. Therefore, one-fourth of
each worker's labor is public service time and three-fourths is private
production time. A 25% flat rate comprehensive income tax will extract
the required revenues.
Nirvana determines that $10,000 is the minimum value of any
worker's private production time, and, thus, the minimum amount of
after-tax income that each worker should be guaranteed. Instead of ex-
plicitly second guessing the market and bureaucratic determinations of
gross income only to the extent of adopting a minimum wage, Nirvana
makes a determination as to the actual value of the services performed by
each of its citizens. Nirvana then takes the excess income of workers
whose labor is overvalued by the market and transfers it to those workers
whose income is undervalued. By this process A, B, C, and D end up
with gross incomes of $40,000, $13,333, $18,667, and $88,000, respec-
tively. These adjustments reflect Nirvana's judgment that the market
overvalued D's labor by $6,000, correctly valued A's services, and under-
valued the contributions of B and C by $3,333 and $2,667, respectively.
After this initial redistribution, the gross incomes of A, B, C, and D re-
flect the true value of their private production time and public service
time. Now Nirvana can extract the value of each worker's public service
63. See supra notes 37-44 and accompanying text.
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time through the simple mechanism of a 25% flat rate comprehensive
income tax allowing no personal exemption.
Chart III shows the tax burdens and after-tax incomes which result
if Nirvana uses market income and a 33 1/3% flat rate comprehensive
income tax allowing a personal exemption equal to the $10,000 minimum
wage, or, alternatively, uses a two-step process of first redistributing mar-
ket income as necessary to reflect the true value of labor performed and
then extracting a 25% flat rate comprehensive income tax allowing no
personal exemption.
CHART III
After-tax True Tax After-tax
Market Tax Paid Income Value Paid Income
Taxpayer Income (Plan Aa) (Plan Aa) Income (Plan Bb) (Plan Bb)
A $ 40,000 $10,000 $ 30,000 $ 40,000 $10,000 $ 30,000
B 10,000 0 10,000 13,333 3,333 10,000
C 16,000 2,000 14,000 18,667 4,667 14,000
D 94,000 28,000 66,000 88,000 22,000 66,000
Total $160,000 $40,000 $120,000 $160,000 $40,000 $120,000
a. 33 1/3% flat rate comprehensive income tax; $10,000 personal exemption.
b. 25% flat rate comprehensive income tax; no personal exemption.
A, B, C, and D have the same after-tax income under either regime.
Both systems generate the $40,000 in revenue needed to fund the public
sector. We can see, therefore, that adopting a 25% flat rate comprehen-
sive income tax allowing a $10,000 personal exemption constitutes an
implicit societal judgment that the true value of A's, B's, C's and D's
private production time and public service time is represented by the
gross income figures in Chart III, column five. Moreover, Chart III
shows that interijecting a personal exemption linked to the minimum
wage constitutes an implicit societal judgment that markets and bureau-
cracies overvalue the contributions of high income taxpayers and under-
value the contributions of low income taxpayers.64
64. This societal judgment is explicit, and, therefore, more politically sensitive in a graduated
rate tax. Graduated rates are, then, a mechanism for redistributing undeserved income and must
explicitly overcome
the difficulty of correlating the "undeserved" income with the rates under a progressive
schedule. To obtain such correlation it is necessary that there be some general relationship
between total income and undeserved income and that the undeserved component increase
more rapidly than the total income. Almost nothing is known about the distribution of
undeserved income, and guesses about its probable distribution seem to be a most precari-
ous base on which to rest the tax structure.
W. BLUM & H. KALVEN, supra note 3, at 81.
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Intuitively, it appears likely that the markets and bureaucracies in
our society overvalue the services of most high income workers and un-
dervalue the services of most low income workers. However, society
would be unwilling to second guess directly the market and bureaucratic
determinations of value beyond the second guess implicit in enactment of
the minimum wage. Therefore, the best we can do is shield from tax the
portion of every taxpayer's gross income that equals the minimum wage.
As a society we can explicitly agree that each worker is morally entitled
to after-tax income in that amount. A flat rate tax with a personal ex-
emption equal to the minimum wage may be viewed, then, as an efficient
and politically feasible mechanism for making implicit, progressive judg-
ments about the true value of the private production time and public
service time of taxpayers at various gross income levels.
D. THE PERSONAL EXEMPTION AND UNEARNED INCOME
The argument presented in the Article up to this point suggests that
post-liberal citizens are morally entitled to income generated by private
production time, yet owe to the government income generated by public
service time.65 However, it is unclear how unearned income-rent, inter-
est or profit received as payment for the use of property, as opposed to
income from one's own services-should be treated. Because unearned
income is not a direct return for private production time, the preceding
analysis does not establish a clear entitlement to receive this income
without diminution by the income tax. On the other hand, since income
tax is a proxy for the public service time owed by each citizen, it is not
immediately clear why any portion of unearned income should be subject
to the income tax. Eventually, a complete theory of the nature of
unearned income and its relationship to the income tax must be devel-
oped. For purposes of this Article it will suffice to describe the basic
features of this theory in order to explain the relationship of unearned
income to the personal exemption.
The total social product-the sum of all goods and services for pri-
vate consumption produced during a given period-is the product of
human labor. Unearned income constitutes a claim against the total so-
cial product, diverted to the owner of capital in return for the use of
money or property.66 Because unearned income represents value created
65. Recall that private production time is the time not owed to society for the production of
public goods.
66. The total social product might be defined as the product of both labor and capital, rather
than labor alone. See Warren, Would a Consumption Tax Be Fairer Than an Income Tax?, 89 YALE
L.J. 1081, 1086 (1980). This view is mistaken because it confuses income with a right to compensa-
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by labor, such income contains elements of both private production time
and public service time.
For example, consider a simple Nirvana where A, B, C, and D each
have gross incomes of $100,000. A represents the public sector, and thus
a 25% flat rate tax is required to generate the revenues needed by govern-
ment.67 The total social product produced during the year has a value of
$300,000-the total after-tax income of Nirvana's citizens. Now let us
interject into Nirvana the phenomenon of private capital. Production of
the social product requires buildings and machinery privately owned by
individual E, who demands a gross income of $100,000 for the use of the
necessary property. 68 As a result, the distribution of gross income
changes. A, B, C, and D now receive gross incomes of $75,000. In effect,
25% of the value of their labor and of their private and public service
time has been transferred to E. As the purpose of the income tax is to
extract the value of the public service time owed by each citizen, the
income tax must extract the value of the public service time transferred
by A, B, C, and D to E, or 25% of E's gross income.
E's moral entitlement to the 75% of E's gross income that repre-
sents the value of A's, B 's, C's, and D's private production time must be
based on the risk taken by E and the benefits to society flowing from this
risk. E's capital might represent after-tax money saved by E over a pe-
riod of years, which E is morally entitled to consume. If, instead, E in-
vests the money, E may reap substantial profits or lose some or all of the
invested capital. In return for this risk, E may be entitled to tax-free
receipt of the private production portion of gross unearned income.6 9
tion that will have tax consequences. Thus the interest paid by a borrower represents social product
created, and income earned, by the borrower, which is paid to the lender as compensation for forego-
ing present consumption of the money lent. Though the lender is entitled to compensation, it is not
for products or services produced by the lender.
67. No personal exemption is necessary because all citizens are, presumably, equally talented
and industrious, and their services are accurately valued.
68. Assume for simplicity that all property is nondepreciable.
69. It is beyond the scope of this Article to deal with problems posed by inflation. It is possi-
ble, however, to view the return on capital as not truly income to the extent the rate of return does
not exceed the rate of inflation. See generally Kelley, Hall, Aronsohn & Hickman, Indexing for
Inflation, 31 TAx LAW. 17 (1977). Treating the return on capital as I suggest necessarily implies a
rejection of the position taken by advocates of a consumption-based definition of income that the
return on capital should be exempted from taxation. For a direct consideration of the merits of a
consumption tax, see BLUEPRINTS, supra note 11; R. GOODE, supra note 46; THE BROOKINGS INSTI-
TUTION, WHAT SHOULD BE TAXED: INCOME OR EXPENDITURE? (J. Pechman ed. 1980); Andrews,
A Consumption-Type or Cash Flow Personal Income Tax, 87 HARv. L. REV. 1113 (1974); Andrews,
Fairness and the Personal Income Tax: A Reply to Professor Warren, 88 HARV. L. REV. 947 (1975);
Kahn, The Place of Consumption and Net-Worth Taxation in the Federal Tax Structure, in BROAD-
BASED TAXES: NEW OPTIONS AND SOURCES 133 (R. Musgrave ed. 1973); Klein, Timing in Per-
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Under this analysis, a person is not entitled to a personal exemption
with respect to unearned income. The function of the personal exemp-
tion is to shield from tax that portion of gross income that every working
citizen is entitled to receive for his or her private production time. There
is no minimum return for capital investment to which the owner of
money or property is entitled. Instead, the recipient of unearned income
is entitled only to that portion of gross unearned income which remains
after extraction of the income tax. This can be illustrated by considering
two hypothetical Nirvanas.
In the first situation, A, B, C, and D earn gross incomes of $40,000,
$80,000, $100,000, and $180,000, respectively. C represents the public
sector, and the annual minimum wage is $25,000. To raise the $100,000
needed to fund the public sector, Nirvana utilizes a 33 1/3% flat rate
comprehensive income tax allowing each taxpayer a $25,000 personal
exemption.
Now interject individual E, who owns property needed to produce
Nirvana's social product and who demands $100,000 in return for the
use of E's capital. Let us hypothesize that this gross income will be ob-
tained through a pro rata reduction of the gross incomes of A, B, C, and
D and that the minimum wage will remain $25,000. A, B, C, and D now
have gross incomes of $30,000, $60,000, $75,000, and $135,000, respec-
tively, and E has a gross income of $100,000. In order to extract the
value of the public service time from A, B, C, and D, including the por-
tion of the value transferred to E, Nirvana will still use a 33 1/3% flat
rate comprehensive income tax that allows a personal exemption equal to
the lesser of $25,000 or a taxpayer's earned income. As E has no earned
income, E is not entitled to a personal exemption.
Chart IV depicts the tax burden borne by Nirvana's citizens in the
hypothetical just described, and illustrates the nature of the tax burden
imposed on unearned income under the suggested approach.
sonal Taxation, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 461 (1977); O'Kelley, Rawls, Justice, and the Income Tax, 16 GA.
L. REV. 1 (1981); Warren, Fairness and a Consumption-Type or Cash Flow Personal Income Tax, 88
HARV. L. REV. 931 (1975); Warren, supra note 66.
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CHART IV
Gross Gross
Income Tax Income Tax Value of Time Transferred
Taxpayer Structure la Structure lb Structure 2c Structure 2 d Public Service to EC
A $ 40,000 $ 5,000 $ 30,000 $ 1,667 $ 3,333
B 80,000 18,333 60,000 11,667 6,666
C 100,000 25,000 75,000 16,667 8,333
D 180,000 51,667 135,000 36,667 15,000
E 0 0 100,00O0 33,333 0
Total $400,000 $100,000 $400,000 $100,000g $33,3339
a. Structure 1 is the world with publicly owned capital.
b. 331/3% flat rate tax with $25,000 personal exemption.
c. Structure 2 is the world with privately owned capital
d. 331/3% flat rate tax with personal exemption equal to lesser of $25,000 or earned income.
e. Column 3 minus column 5.
f. Unearned income.
g. Rounded.
As Chart IV indicates, the total social product is $300,000, whether
capital is publicly or privately owned. Introducing private capital creates
claims against the total social product by those owning private capital.
These claims are paid by diverting a portion of the value of the public
service and private production time of other citizens. Subjecting E's
earned income to a flat rate tax, without allowing an offsetting personal
exemption, results in a recapture of the value of the public service time
transferred to the owner of capital and embodied in his or her gross
unearned income. Thus, the difference between the tax paid by A, B, C,
and D in a publicly owned capital regime (column 3) and in a privately
owned capital regime (column 5), totals $33,333 (column 6), which is the
tax extracted from E.
The inappropriateness of allowing unearned income to be offset by a
personal exemption can be shown in another, more traditional, way.
Suppose that A has invested $200,000 in a savings account at a simple
interest rate of ten percent per year, and that Nirvana has established a
$10,000 minimum wage and a personal exemption of the same amount.
Further, suppose that A chooses to take a one-year leave of absence from
A's job and finances this vacation with the interest earned on the savings
account. Instead of saying that A has a gross income of $20,000 and is
entitled to no personal exemption, Nirvana might allow A a $10,000 per-
sonal exemption, but treat A as having a gross income of $30,000. A has
chosen not to work and thereby realizes imputed income from leisure
enjoyed during the hours when most citizens work. There could be no
objection by A if s.ociety attaches a $10,000 value to such leisure. This is
[Vol. 58:727
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the minimum value to society of A's normal work time. Allowing a per-
sonal exemption only to the extent of an individual's gross earned income
has the effect of imputing to the individual additional gross income equal
to the difference between the minimum wage and his or her gross earned
income. This difference represents the individual's income from
leisure.70
III. THE IMPACT OF SHARING ARRANGEMENTS
The argument in Part II assumes a series of hypothetical post-liberal
societies populated by unmarried adults living apart. In this Part, I con-
sider how the income tax should be designed in a post-liberal society
populated by working and nonworking adults, some of whom live alone,
and some of whom live with friends, lovers, or spouses. Tax policy schol-
ars have identified the basic design questions.71 What is the basic taxable
unit-the individual, the family, or the household? Should the income
tax take into account economies of scale achievable in sharing arrange-
ments? How should the income tax adjust relative tax burdens to reflect
the imputed income attributable to nonworking members of sharing
units? Finally, is it possible simultaneously to achieve: (1) progressivity;
(2) equal tax burdens for married couples or sharing units with the same
total income; and (3) marriage or sharer status neutrality? I address these
and related questions in this Part and argue that a comprehensive flat
rate tax, properly understood and designed, yields an appropriate alloca-
tion of tax burdens among working and nonworking adults living to-
gether or alone.
A. THE TAXABLE UNIT AND ECONOMIES OF SCALE
Gross income can be broken down into two categories: income from
labor, or "earned income," and income from property, or "unearned in-
come." To this point, we have assumed that the individual is the proper
taxable unit. However, the proper taxable unit and the income properly
attributable to the individual becomes less certain when sharing arrange-
ments are considered.
Consider, for example, A and B, the former earning $100,000 annu-
70. See infra notes 83-97 and accompanying text for the proposed treatment of imputed in-
come from household services performed by nonworking spouses.
71. For comprehensive treatment of the basic issues, see Bittker, Federal Income Taxation and
the Family, 27 STAN. L. RaV. 1389 (1975); Gann, Abandoning Marital Status as a Factor in Allocat-
ing Income Tax Burdens, 59 TEX. L. REv. 1 (1980); McIntyre & Oldman, Taxation of the Family in
a Comprehensive and Simplified Income Tax, 90 HARV. L. REv. 1573 (1977).
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ally, the latter deriving no market income from property or services. If A
and B are married to each other and reside in a community property
state, then B obtains a one-half interest in the income earned by A. If A
and B, still married, reside in a noncommunity property state, then B
obtains equitable claims against A's income and property, which may
ripen upon divorce or death. Likewise, if A and B are unmarried, but live
together, B in some jurisdictions may obtain equitable claims against A's
property. If the individual is the proper taxable unit, it might seem ap-
propriate to treat some of the working sharer's income as shifted to the
nonworking sharer to reflect the legal and equitable claims that the
nonworker possesses.72
Alternatively, it might seem appropriate to deal with sharing ar-
rangements by abandoning the premise that the individual is the appro-
priate taxable unit.7 3 It may be assumed that married individuals and
others who live together pool their resources and make consumption de-
cisions by reference to the needs and aspirations of each other and of the
unit as a whole.74 Moreover, it is impossible to assume that the standard
of living or consumption decisions of A and B would depend on whether
they resided in a community property state, or on whether their sharing
arrangement was marital or nonmarital. Clearly, then, the benefits of
income consumed by individual sharers cannot be traced in an adminis-
tratively feasible way, or attributed to particular individuals with accu-
racy.7' Thus, the sharing unit could be viewed as the appropriate taxable
unit both because the combined income of sharers provides the only
meaningful basis of assessing the relative well being of different sharing
units and because the combined income of sharers must be viewed as
72. It might seem appropriate also to shift a portion of a higher earning spouse's income to a
lower earning spouse in the case of a two-worker couple. For the advantages and political problems
of income splitting based on property rights, see Gann, supra note 71, at 58-65. For an argument for
income splitting based on who actually benefits from joint income, see McIntyre, Individual Filing in
the Personal Income Tax: Prolegomena to Future Discussion, 58 N.C.L. REV. 469 (1980); McIntyre
& Oldman, supra note 71, at 1592-99.
73. See London, The Family as the Basic Tax Unit, 1 CAN. TAX'N, Winter, 1979, 4, 5; McIn-
tyre, supra note 72, at 470-71; McMahon, Expanding the Taxable Unit: The Aggregation of the
Income of Children and Parents, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 60, 61-62 (1981).
74. See ROYAL COMMISSION ON TAXATION No. 10, TAXATION OF THE FAMILY 122-24
(1966); BLUEPRINTS, supra note 11, at 103.
75. It would be possible to apply an arbitrary attribution rule. See Coven, The Decline and Fall
of Taxable Income, 79 MICH. L. REv. 1525, 1542-45 (1981); McIntyre, Economic Mutuality and the
Need for Joint Filing, I CAN. TAX'N, Winter, 1979, 13, 15. However, such a mechanism would
discriminate against those whose sharing patterns differ from the general rule. Moreover, there is
little likelihood that agreement can be reached as to the "normal" level of income splitting. See
Dulude, Joint Taxation of Spouses-A Feminist View, I CAN. TAX'N, Winter, 1979, 8, 9.
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realized by the unit rather than its individual members.76
The argument for treating individuals as the appropriate taxable
unit, but requiring that earned income be allocated among members of
sharing units to reflect legal and equitable rights to such income, and the
arguments for treating the family as the basic taxable unit, assume that
the basic purpose of the income tax is to raise revenue in a horizontally
and vertically equitable manner. If this assumption is correct, scholars
are free to propose whatever tax structure appeals to the scholar's per-
sonal notions of justice or efficiency. Instead, as I argued in Part II of
this Article, the primary purpose of an income tax is to extract taxes in a
manner that takes into account the relative contribution to society of
each worker.77 More specifically, I argued that the purpose of the in-
come tax is to extract the value of each worker's public service time,
while leaving untaxed the income from a worker's private production
time. Moreover, each worker is entitled to a personal exemption calcu-
lated by reference to his or her own income. If I am right about this,
then in order to justly determine after-tax incomes, the income tax must
be designed so that each individual is taxed on his or her own earned and
unearned income.
Related to the basic taxable unit question is the issue of whether tax
burdens should be adjusted to reflect the economies of scale in consump-
tion achievable in sharing relationships.78 By sharing facilities andhouse-
hold duties, two individuals who live together can achieve a given
standard of living less expensively than they could if each lived alone.
These economies of scale could be viewed as a type of wealth, income, or
increased ability to pay tax, which should be taken into account for fed-
eral income tax purposes.
For example, consider A and B, who each earn $10,000 per year,
and who live together, sharing resources and household duties. Let us
suppose that A and B could achieve the same standard of living apart
only if they each had $500 per year more to spend. If this is so, then it is
irrelevant whether A and B use the extra $1,000 for additional living
space or services, or save $1,000 for future consumption. Irrespective of
how A and B choose to use their resources, they are still $1,000 better off
76. Income, in a sense, is not realized until it is consumed. Within families, then, income is
realized when it is spent, and such realization cannot accurately be attributed to any particular
member of the family unit. BLUEPRINTS, supra note 11, at 103-04.
77. See supra notes 24-70 and accompanying text.
78. See Bittker, supra note 71, at 1422-26; Coven, supra note 75, at 1541-45; Gann, supra note
71, at 29.
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than two individuals, each earning $10,000, but living apart. 79 This "in-
come" from economies of scale theoretically can be taken into account
under an individual filing system by imputing $500 to each individual in
a sharing arrangement, by reducing the personal exemption of each
member of a sharing unit by $500, or by increasing the personal exemp-
tion of individuals living alone by $500. Alternatively, sharers and non-
sharers could be required to use different rate schedules calibrated to
impose tax burdens that take into account the economies of scale deemed
available to sharers.
Designing the income tax to take into account economies of scale
would, however, be inconsistent with the purpose of income taxation and
with the underlying ideological rationale of post- liberal society. Since
each individual is entitled to the product of his or her private production
time, it is the function of the income tax to extract only the value of
public service time. How a person chooses to use the resources at his or
her command has no relevance to a determination of the value of a per-
son's public service time. Thus, if an individual chooses to enter a shar-
ing arrangement, thereby reducing his or her cost of living and freeing up
resources for other uses, this resource allocation decision is irrelevant for
income tax purposes."0
Put another way, it is consistent with the value that post-liberal soci-
ety places on the family and on communitarian relationships generally to
view the individual as the basic unit of society, and to refuse to take
account of "income" from economies of scale. Taking into account econ-
omies of scale would penalize those who enter sharing arrangements be-
cause it imposes a heavier tax burden than if they lived apart. Such a tax
discriminates against a sharing lifestyle in favor of the lifestyle of those
who choose to live alone.
There is an additional, pragmatic reason for treating as irrelevant
the economies of scale possible in sharing arrangements. If a penalty
were thought appropriate, then fundamental fairness would demand that
unmarried individuals who enter sharing arrangements bear an increased
79. This income could be described as the product of the dual consumption financed by one
spouse's income. This description suggests that some portion of the higher earning spouse's income
should be attributed to the other spouse without allowing any offsetting deduction to the higher
earning spouse. Coven, supra note 75, at 1541-44.
80. Those who believe that economies of scale should not be taken into account focus on two
problems: the problem of fair relative tax treatment of married and unmarried individuals and the
problem of measurement. See Bittker, supra note 71, at 1422-26; Gann, supra note 71, at 29. I am
suggesting a deeper reason for ignoring economies of scale. Given the purpose of the income tax, the
economic benefits from economies of scale in consumption do not constitute income, even in theory.
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tax burden. The massive invasion of personal privacy necessary to en-
force such a provision would be inconsistent with our societal belief in
the sanctity of the home and the right to privacy.81
Finally, taking economies of scale into account or treating sharing
units as taxable units is inappropriate because it implies that sharing ar-
rangements, once created, are a basic irreducible social unit. Given the
ease and frequency of divorce and the growing number of individuals
who enter informal, easily terminated sharing arrangements, 82 sharing
arrangements-marital or nonmarital--cannot fairly be viewed as either
permanent or irreducible units. Instead, sharing arrangements can more
accurately be described as an ongoing choice. So viewed, the ongoing
resource allocation choices made by sharers and the resource allocation
consequences of entering a sharing arrangement are as irrelevant for tax
purposes as are other consumption choices made by individuals.
B. IMPUTED INCOME FROM HOUSEHOLD PRODUCTION, FAIR
RELATIVE TAX BURDENS, AND DISINCENTIVES TO LABOR
FORCE PARTICIPATION BY NONWORKING
SPOUSES
One of the shortcomings of our present income tax system is its fail-
ure to impose relative tax burdens on one- and two-worker couples that
adequately reflect the value of services performed by nonworking spouses
for personal or family, rather than market, consumption.83 The problem
is easily illustrated. A and B are a married couple; each spouse works
full-time and earns $50,000 per year. C and D are also a married couple.
C works outside the home, earning $100,000 annually. D has no market
income. Instead, during the normal working day D performs the couple's
household-related chores.
Clearly, C and D are economically better off than A and B because
during the normal workday D is able to perform the household duties
that A and B must either (1) perform themselves, thereby reducing their
leisure time relative to C and D; or (2) hire someone else to perform,
thereby reducing their disposable income relative to C and D. Accord-
ingly, the value of the services performed by D constitutes a form of
81. See Bittker, supra note 71, at 1423.
82. Wolk, Federal Tax 0 ces of Wealth Transfer Between Unmarried Cohabitants, 27
UCLA L. REv. 1240, 1240-41 n.I198c).
83. Unless the context indicates'o the contrary, the term "nonworking spouse" includes non-
working members of both marital and nonmarital sharing units.
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nonmarket income that should result in a larger tax bill for C and D.84
A second, related flaw is the disincentive to labor market participa-
tion by nonworking spouses produced by the present income tax struc-
ture. If a nonworking spouse has a choice between performing
household services worth $10,000 annually or working outside the home
for a $10,000 annual salary, then the income tax is neutral only if it im-
poses identical tax consequences on income from either source. 85 Be-
cause the present income tax scheme fails to tax income from home
production, it operates to keep those without scarce skills from joining
the labor force.8 6 Most nonworking spouses are women who are eco-
nomically dependent on their husbands. Thus, what is in form a gender-
neutral favoritism of home production may in fact be a form of sex dis-
crimination that tends to keep women economically dependent on men. 87
To illustrate the problem of discrimination, consider again C and D,
the former earning $100,000 annually and the latter, a nonworking
spouse performing household services valued at $10,000 annually. D is
offered an entry-level job paying a salary of $10,000. D would like to
accept the job, and believes it would eventually lead to a better paying
position. D will be reluctant to take the job, however, if it will adversely
affect the standard of living C and D presently enjoy. Assume that Nir-
vana imposes a graduated rate comprehensive income tax that is similar
to our own federal income tax system. Thus, Nirvana treats married
couples as a taxable unit, requires that spouses combine their income for
tax purposes, and extends a $5,000 personal exemption to each marital
unit, whether composed of one worker or two. The tax burden is 20% of
the first $50,000 of taxable income and 50% of taxable income in excess
of $50,000. Chart V shows the tax burden borne by C and D if only C is
employed outside the home, or, instead, if both C and D are market
workers.
84. Bittker, supra note 71, at 1425-26.
85. Rosen, Is It Time to Abandon Joint Filing?, 30 NAT'L TAX J. 423, 425, 426 (1977).
86. For nonworking spouses with the ability to earn large incomes, such as lawyers or doctors,
the income tax may play a relatively minor role in deciding whether or not to work.
87. See Blumberg, Sexism in the Code: A Comparative Std of Income Taxation of Working
Wives and Mothers, 21 BUFFALO L. Rlv. 49, 89-95 (1971); 1 The Marriage Penalty: The
Working Couple's Dilemma, 47 FORDHAM L. REv. 27, 36-37 (198 .. Of course, in some cases the
code would act as a disincentive to nonworking male spouses contemplating labor market participa-
tion. Therefore, it is important to view the imputed income problem as not solely an issue of sex
discrimination. Rosen, supra note 85, at 426.
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CHART V
Total
C's Gross D's Gross Taxable After-Tax
Income Income Income Tax Income
$100,000 $ 0 $ 95,000 $32,500 $67,500
100,000 10,000 105,000 37,500 72,500
If D accepts market employment, D receives no benefit from the
personal exemption allowed to the marital unit because the couple's ex-
emption has already been used to exempt a portion of Cs income from
tax. In effect, all of D's income is taxed at the marginal rate of 50%
instead of the lower rate that would apply if D were the marital unit's
only market worker. Accordingly, if D accepts the job offered, C and D
will receive $5,000 in after-tax income at the cost of $10,000 in untaxed
services formerly performed by D.88
Suppose, instead, that Nirvana adopts a filing system that requires
each taxpayer to pay tax on his or her own earned income. The rate
structure remains unchanged, but each taxpayer is allowed only a $2,500
personal exemption. Chart VI shows the tax consequences of D's deci-
sion to accept market employment under this individual filing system.
CHART VI
C's C's D's D's Total
Gross Taxable C's Gross Taxable D's After-Tax
Income Income Tax Income Income Tax Income
$100,000 $97,500 $33,750 $ 0 $ 0 $ 0 $66,250
100,000 97,500 33,750 10,000 7,500 1,500 74,750
If D accepts market employment, C and D will receive $8,500 more
in after-tax income at the cost of $10,000 in household services formerly
performed by D. Thus, individual filing (Chart VI) results in a larger
after-tax return to the nonworking spouse entering the market than
under joint filing (Chart V). However, single filing does not eliminate the
tax bias in favor of home production.
88. The problem is not solely one of taxing D's income at higher marginal rates than would
result under separate filing. If Nirvana imposed a proportional tax at a 20% rate, required joint
filing, and allowed married couples a $5,000 personal exemption, then C and D would receive a total
of $8,000 in after-tax income from D's job at the cost of $10,000 in household services, even though
D's income was taxed at the same marginal rate as if D were unmarried.
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Congress has acknowledged the tax relevance of household services
performed by nonworking spouses by enacting Internal Revenue Code
section 221. This section allows married couples to deduct either 10% of
the lesser earning spouse's earned income, or $3,000, whichever is less.89
Under this provision, two-worker couples bear a greater tax burden than
one-worker couples with the same total market income. Additionally,
section 221 decreases the tax burden that would otherwise fall on the
market income of a previously nonworking spouse. Section 221 clearly
lessens the tax disincentives against labor market participation in favor of
home production, and indirectly imputes income to all married taxpayers
who do not qualify for the deduction. However, section 221 arrives at
fair relative tax burdens between one- and two-worker couples and elimi-
nates the bias in favor of home production only if (1) it imposes identical
tax burdens on market and nonmarket income of equal value; or (2) it is
impossible to impose identical tax burdens on market and nonmarket
income of equal value and section 221 constitutes the fairest practical
solution.9" Thus, a criticism of the present system requires both a con-
vincing objective explanation of imputed income from household serv-
ices, and an administratively feasible way of taking this income into
account.
Consider again C and D. Assume that C is a single adult, living
alone, and unwilling to sacrifice leisure time in order to perform house-
hold services. Under this assumption, if D accepts market employment,
C will hire someone to perform those services. 91 Moreover, the individ-
ual hired will obviously treat his or her wages as gross income. Thus, it
seems accurate to view D as C's employee for the limited purpose of de-
termining the proper income tax consequences of D's household services.
In effect, then, D must be viewed as receiving present and future claims
to C's income in return for household services performed.
The purpose of the income tax is to determine the after-tax income
to which each taxpayer is morally entitled. Once the quasi-employment
nature of C's and D's relationship is recognized, it becomes imperative,
89. Congress added I.R.C. § 221 to the Code as part of the Economic Recovery Tax Act of
1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, 95 Stat. 173 (1981).
90. I.R.C. § 221 was motivated in part by a desire to achieve equity between one- and two-
worker couples and in part by a desire to eliminate the marriage tax "penalty," the rule that requires
two-worker married couples to pay more tax than two otherwise similarly situated individuals whose
sharing arrangement is nonmarital. I am concerned here with only the first objective. It is clear,
however, that section 221 does not eliminate the marriage penalty. STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON
WAYS AND MEANS, 97TH CONG., IST SEss., REPORT ON H.R. 4242, at 54 (Comm. Print 1981).
91. Assume, also, that D is equally unwilling to use normal leisure time to perform the services
that D formerly performed.
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as a matter of fairness to other taxpayers,92 to value and tax D's income.
Furthermore, if my ideological myth is convincing, each taxpayer should
owe a certain amount of public service time to the cooperative venture
for mutual advantage of which we are all members. 93 Imputing income
to "nonworking" spouses is required in order to extract from them the
value of their public service time.
At the same time, imputing income to the nonworking spouse con-
stitutes societal recognition of his or her status as a wage earner and a
valuable contributor to the social product. Post-liberal society values
workers more highly than nonworkers. As we have seen, low income
workers are protected by the minimum wage, while those who cannot
work are supported at a lower level.94 Viewing "nonworking" spouses as
valuable members of the labor force, therefore, should provide support
for extending social security and other employment-related benefits to
nonworking spouses on the same basis as these benefits are provided to
market workers.95
Despite the theoretical advantages of this quasi-employment ap-
proach, there must also be an explanation of how the imputed income
can be quantified. Initially, this problem may seem insuperable. Some
nonworking spouses are married to wealthy individuals, others are not.
Some one-worker couples equally divide the market earnings of the
working spouse, while others divide this market income disproportion-
ately. Clearly, there is no administratively feasible or societally accepta-
ble method of assessing the actual practices of couples or the distributive
impact of state laws.96
It is not necessary, however, to determine how much of the worker's
income is actually redistributed to the nonworking spouse. While some
nonworkers undoubtedly perform their household chores well, and
others poorly, the value of basic household services is probably quite sim-
ilar. Moreover, these basic chores can with minimal training be per-
formed adequately by almost anyone. Consequently, individuals
92. Otherwise, those whose contributions are rewarded in the market will pay tax and receive a
lower after-tax reward than those who provide untaxed household services constituting an equally
valuable contribution to the social product.
93. See supra notes 37-44 and accompanying text.
94. See supra text accompanying notes 56-57.
95. A central thesis of the civil and equal rights movements on behalf of women and various
minorities is the thesis that equal performance should be equally rewarded. Properly characterizing
the "work" of nonworking spouses would be a helpful step in achieving equal rights for such
workers.
96. See, eg., McIntyre & Oldman, supra note 71, at 1614-18 (estimates the patterns of imputed
income from self-performed services of one- and two-job married couples).
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performing household-related services-cooking, cleaning, laundering,
and grocery and other shopping-are among the lowest paid workers in
society. Thus, it is objectively justifiable to impute to each nonworking
spouse an income equal to the minimum wage that society demands be
paid to workers who are without scarce skills.
The great disparity in actual property rights and standards of living
enjoyed by nonworking spouses should not be explained as the result of
disparate quasi-salaries for household work. Instead, it is a result of the
voluntary or state-mandated sharing of resources that occurs in marital
and nonmarital sharing arrangements. This redistribution of property
rights other than in return for household services that occurs in bcth
one- and two-worker couples, constitutes no more than the use of after-
tax income by the transferor and the receipt of a tax-free gift by the do-
nee, and is irrelevant for tax purposes.9 7
Chart VII illustrates how A, B, C, and D would be taxed in Nirvana
under a 20% flat rate comprehensive income tax that requires single fil-
ing, allows a personal exemption equal to the lesser of $10,000 or the
taxpayer's earned income, and imputes $10,000-the minimum wage-to
nonworking spouses.
97. Scholars also miss the point when they suggest that no principled line can be drawn be-
tween types of imputed income from personal services that should be taxable and those that should
not. Typical are the remarks of Professors McIntyre and Oldman:
For example, which if any of the following services should be taxable: Getting up in the
morning? Doing exercises? Singing in the shower? Grooming oneself? Fixing breakfast?
Chewing food? Processing it within the stomach? Walking to work? Baking bread?
Growing roses? Fixing the car? Driving in the country? Watching T.V.? Reading a
novel? Reading bedtime stories to one's children? Playing backgammon?
Id. at 1611. The purpose of the income tax is to extract taxes based on the relative contribution to
the social product made by each taxpayer. Each citizen owes a certain amount of public service time
to society. Imputing income to "nonworking" spouses is essential in order to extract from them the
value of this public service time. The fairest way to arrive at a figure is to determine the market
value of the household services that would be purchased by the working spouse in the absence of a
nonworking spouse. Affection and sexual relations are not considered. Nor are services of the type
that everyone performs for himself or herself.
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CHART VIII
Total
After-
Market Gross Personal Tax
Taxpayer Income Incomea Exemption Tax Income
A $ 50,000 $ 50,000 $10,000 $ 8,000 $42,000
B 50,000 50,000 10,000 8,000 42,000
C 100,000 100,000 10,000 18,000 82,000
D 0 10,000 10,000 0 10,000
a. Includes imputed income.
D, the nonworking spouse, is entitled to a personal exemption equal
to the minimum wage, resulting in no taxable income. C is not entitled
to a deduction for the imputed wage paid to D, because this payment is
not incurred in a trade or business or in connection with an income-
producing activity. It constitutes an item of personal consumption for
which no deduction is allowed.9" There are, accordingly, no direct tax
consequences to C and D as a result of D's imputed income. However, A
and B's collective tax burden is $2,000 less than C and D's collective tax
burden. Moreover, the difference in these tax burdens presumably re-
sults not from an ad hoe attempt to achieve greater fairness; instead, the
difference is the natural product of a tax system-itself objectively justi-
fied-that treats the individual as the basic taxable unit and determines
tax liability by reference to each individual's contribution to the social
product.
It should also be clear that imputing the minimum wage to non-
working spouses will eliminate the present bias in favor of home produc-
tion. If D accepts a full-time job at an annual salary of $10,000, the tax
consequences to C and D will be the same as illustrated in Chart VII.
Since D's normal work time is now devoted to labor force participation,
D's imputed income from home production is reduced to zero. However,
D's gross income remains $10,000 because of the wages received from
market employment. The tax imposed on D is the same whether D
chooses to work in the home or outside the home for an equivalent in-
come. Accordingly, an income tax that requires individual filing, imputes
the minimum wage to nonworking spouses, and allows a personal exemp-
tion equal to the minimum wage, not only arrives at just relative tax
burdens between one- and two-worker couples, but is neutral as to the
choice between home and market production as well.
98. I.R.C. § 262 (1982).
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C. FLAT RATES, GRADUATED RATES, AND INSOLUBLE DILEMMAS
As illustrated in Part I of this Article, progressivity can be achieved
under a flat rate tax through a personal exemption. Part II shows that a
flat rate comprehensive tax with a personal exemption equal to the mini-
mum wage is progressive and more consistent with the governing ideo-
logical rationale of post-liberal society than is a graduated rate tax. The
first two Sections of this Part of the Article explain how a flat rate tax
must be designed to achieve appropriate relative tax burdens among
working and nonworking individuals. In this Section, I will explain how
a flat rate tax of the type described is superior to a graduated rate tax
when evaluated in terms of important tax policy maxims and design
criteria.
It is generally assumed that an income tax cannot be designed to
satisfy simultaneously three maxims of tax fairness:
1. The income tax should be progressive.
2. Married couples with the same total income should pay
equivalent taxes.
3. The income tax should be marriage-neutral, so that tax burdens
do not change as a result of marriage or divorce.99
To illustrate the impossibility of simultaneous satisfaction of these
maxims, consider three Nirvanian married couples-A and B, C and D,
and E and F-each having combined market incomes of $100,000. A
and B each earn $50,000 per year, C earns $75,000 and D $25,000 per
year. E earns $100,000 annually, while F is a nonworking spouse. First,
assume that Nirvana's income tax treats the individual as the basic taxa-
ble unit, allows each taxpayer a $2,500 personal exemption, and extracts
20% of the first $50,000 of taxable income and 50% of the taxable in-
come in excess of $50,000. Obviously such a tax system will be progres-
sive and each individual will pay the same tax whether married or
unmarried. However, as Chart VIII shows, this tax structure violates the
maxim that married couples with identical total incomes should be simi-
larly taxed.
99. See BLUEPRINTS, supra note 11, at 102; Bittker, supra note 71, at 1395-96; McIntyre &
Oldman, supra note 71, at 1589-92.
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CHART VIII
Couples'
Gross Taxable After-Tax
Taxpayer Income Income Tax Income
A $ 50,000 $47,500 $ 9,500 $81,000
B 50,000 47,500 9,500
C 75,000 72,500 21,250 74,250
D 25,000 22,500 4,500
E 100,000 97,500 33,750 66,250
F 0 0 0
Suppose, instead, that Nirvana treats the married couple as the taxa-
ble unit, extends a $5,000 personal exemption to each marital unit, and
uses the same rate structure-that described in the preceding para-
graph-for marital units and unmarried individuals. Under this joint fil-
ing structure each of the couples will have taxable incomes of $95,000
and pay $32,500 in tax. Thus, joint filing achieves both progressivity and
equal taxation of equal income couples. This system is not marital status
neutral, however, because, as Chart VIII shows, the total tax burden
borne by our three couples would not be the same were they unmarried.
Another problem with graduated rates can now be isolated. Assume
that for political reasons it is essential to equally tax married couples
with the same total income." ° Given graduated rates, this means that
we must impose a tax on the combined incomes of married individuals.
Furthermore, depending on the rate structures applicable to individuals
and marital units, married individuals will pay either more tax or less tax
than they would if unmarried. Now compare married individuals A and
B, who each earn $50,000 per year, with unmarried individuals G and H,
who each earn $50,000 per year and who live together and share re-
sources and duties in the same manner as A and B. Presumably post-
liberal society is neutral as to the decision to marry or live together."'
Accordingly, the income tax should impose similar tax burdens on simi-
100. Since 1948 the income tax has been calculated with reference to the combined income of
married couples. This feature was intended to achieve equal treatment between married couples in
community property jurisdictions and those in common law jurisdictions. Prior to 1948, community
property spouses could split their total income and file as individuals. Similary situated spouses in
common law jurisdictions could not. See Bittker, supra note 71, at 1399-1414. Thus, it can be
argued persuasively that Congress has never evinced a belief either that the family is the proper
taxable unit, or that equal income married couples should be equally taxed. Instead, Congress has
dealt pragmatically with perceived problems.
101. For an analysis of changes in the present structure to reflect neutrality toward lifestyle
choice, see generally Wolk, supra note 82.
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larly situated married and unmarried couples. However, if the tax sys-
tem imposes a lesser burden on married and unmarried sharers than on
two nonsharers with equivalent incomes, society must be prepared to in-
vade the privacy of all married and unmarried individuals who claim
sharer status to determine if they are, in fact, in a sharing arrangement.
On the other hand, if the tax system imposes a greater tax burden on
sharers than on nonsharers with equivalent incomes, the tax system must
be prepared to invade the privacy of married and unmarried individuals
who claim nonsharer status to make certain that they are not, in fact, a
sharing unit. If instead we adopt a system that requires joint filing by
married individuals only, then the problems of privacy invasion will di-
minish.1"2 However, this system will discriminate against either married
or unmarried sharers, depending on whether the tax burden imposed on
individuals in marital units is more or less than the total burden that
would result if the sharers were unmarried.
These dilemmas are inherent in a tax that uses graduated rates to
achieve progressivity, but can be resolved by a progressive fiat rate tax.
Assume that Nirvana treats the individual as the taxable unit, uses a
30% flat rate comprehensive income tax, allows each taxpayer a personal
exemption equal to the minimum wage of $10,000, and imputes the mini-
mum wage to all nonworking spouses. Chart IX illustrates the tax bur-
dens borne by A, B, C, D, E, and F under such a system.
CHART IX
Couples'
After-Tax
Gross Taxable Market
Taxpayer Income Income Tax Income
A $ 50,000 $40,000 $12,000 $76,000
B 50,000 40,000 12,000
C 75,000 65,000 19,500 76,000
D 25,000 15,000 4,500
E 100,000 90,000 27,000 73,000
F 10,000 0 0
a. Imputed income from household services performed.
The tax burdens of A and B, and of C and D, are unaffected by
sharer status. These two couples have the same total income and pay the
102. Marital status is easily verifiable, although the potential for sham divorces or marriages
exists.
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same tax. Thus, a properly designed flat rate tax simultaneously achieves
progressivity, sharer status neutrality, and equal tax burdens for equal
income sharers. Chart IX also reminds us that E and F have a different
total income than the other two couples because of the imputed income
received by F, the nonworking spouse. Thus, a properly designed flat
rate tax not only achieves equal taxation of equal income sharers, but
also allows us to refine our definition of income to account for the eco-
nomic benefits traceable to household services performed by nonworking
spouses.10 3
Another problem that plagues graduated income taxes is intrafamily
property transfers made to individuals with lower incomes and, thus,
lower marginal tax rates."° These transfers lower the tax borne by the
family unit even though the transferor may retain substantial control
over the property transferred. For example, consider A with an annual
salary of $100,000 and an annual unearned income of $100,000. A is
married to B, a nonworking spouse. A and B have two nonworking mi-
nor children, C and D. Under a graduated rate tax that treats the indi-
vidual as the basic taxable unit, A's income-producing property can be
transferred to B, C, and D. Thereafter, the unearned income will be
taxed at the lower marginal rates that apply to B, C, and D given their
lack of other income.
However, under a flat rate comprehensive income tax that requires
individual filing and allows a personal exemption equal to the lesser of
the minimum wage or the taxpayer's earned income, A will effect no re-
duction in total family tax burden by transferring income-producing
property to B, C, and D. Because C and D have no earned income, they
are entitled to no personal exemption.0 5 Because B is deemed to receive
imputed earned income equal to the minimum wage for household serv-
ices performed, B is entitled to a personal exemption. However, the per-
sonal exemption must be used to offset B's imputed income. Thus, all of
the unearned income transferred to B, C, and D is subject to taxation.
Moreoever, in a flat rate tax system the marginal rate of tax will be the
same for A, B, C, and D. Thus, under a progressive flat rate tax, in-
trafamily property transfers will leave tax burdens unchanged.
103. I.R.C. § 221 indirectly achieves a minor imputation of income to nonworking spouses. See
supra text accompanying note 90. However, this result cannot be viewed as an abandonment of the
principle that equal income spouses should be equally taxed. Instead, it constitutes an attempt to
redefine income so that equal income taxpayers can be identified.
104. For a careful analysis of tax-motivated intrafamily income shifting, see McMahon, supra
note 73, at 62-86 (arguing for a taxable unit including both spouses and children).
105. See supra notes 65-70 and accompanying text.
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IV. SOCIAL SECURITY AND THE INCOME TAX
A. A POST-LIBERAL CRITIQUE
To deal with the phenomenon of retirement from employment, al-
most every country provides retirement income to some or all of its citi-
zens.1°6 Obviously, a social security program requires a financing
mechanism. This Section of the Article describes the nature of retire-
ment in post-liberal society and develops an argument that the proper
source of funds is a progressive flat rate tax allowing a personal exemp-
tion equal to the minimum wage.
Proponents of individualism believe that gross income belongs to the
individual and that each individual is responsible for finding work and
meeting his or her subsistence needs. Thus each person is responsible for
his or her own retirement needs. Amounts of current income sufficient to
meet these future retirement needs must be set aside by the individual. 107
What is set aside by those who save, however, is merely a claim
reducible to money in the future. Society does not concurrently set aside
a corresponding amount of commodities. Thus, one who wishes to save
commodities for future consumption must purchase the actual commod-
ity and store it. This option, of course, is of limited practicality.
Although saving money does give one a claim against goods that do not
yet exist, there is no guarantee that sufficient goods will be produced or
that the money being saved will be sufficient to purchase required
commodities.'0 8
If commodities are to be available in sufficient quantity and quality
at the time of retirement, there must be sufficient productive capacity at
that future date. The individualist asserts that a free market will assure
this result. Self-interested individuals will reinvest enough capital into
their businesses to insure their own future income.
Post-liberal society rejects total reliance on the free market and the
individual pursuit of self-interest. It acknowledges the obligation of soci-
ety as a whole to insure that future consumption needs can be met. Post-
liberal society is actively concerned with monitoring and regulating the
economy to ensure that sufficient agricultural and industrial capacity will
106. OFFICE OF RESEARCH AND STATISTICS, SOCIAL SECURITY ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T.
HEALTH, EDUC. & WELFARE, SOCIAL SECURITY PROGRAMS THROUGHOUT THE WORLD 1977, at
iii (HEW Pub. No. 78-11805).
107. See M. FRIEDMAN & R. FRIEDMAN, supra note 58, at 119-24.
108. See Teeters, Payroll Tax, in BROAD-BASED TAXES: NEW OPTIONS AND SOURCES 87, 91-
94 (R. Musgrave ed. 1973).
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exist in the future. Post-liberal society, then, undertakes to ensure for its
citizens what cannot be ensured by private savings or the accrual of
claims to money income from social security. It undertakes to insure that
a reasonable quantity of actual goods will be available in the future.
In addition to rejecting the individualist view that the market alone
will function to ensure the future production of adequate commodities,
post-liberal society rejects the individualist belief that each person is re-
sponsible for providing adequate funds for retirement. Instead, post-lib-
eral society views its citizens as being engaged in a cooperative venture
for mutual advantage. All citizens should work for a reasonable number
of days during each year of their working lives. In return for past contri-
butions to the social product, every individual is entitled to retire and
receive a reasonable retirement income from the government. Thus, so-
cial security payments are earned to the same extent as wages received
during work.10 9
To understand this point let us return to Nirvana. As noted in Part
II of this Article, the founders of Nirvana would be concerned about
their future well-being leading to their agreement to provide welfare
assistance as a public good. The founders would also be concerned with
the need to provide for retirement. At the outset Nirvana does not use
money as a medium of exchange and does not have private ownership of
the means of production. As a result, a worker's income is received in
the form of an in kind distribution of perishable consumer goods. This
makes it impossible to save for retirement. The consumption needs of
retirees must instead be satisfied with goods and services produced by
those who have not yet retired. Accordingly, Nirvana's founders would
require as a condition to citizenship that each worker agree to spend a
societally determined equal amount of time making or providing goods
and services for retirees. Thus social security benefits are a public good
and a portion of each worker's public service time is devoted to its provi-
sion. Nonetheless, each retiree is believed to be morally entitled to social
security benefits as payment for past contributions to society.
This description of retirement and the nature of social security pay-
ments in post-liberal society suggests several criticisms of the present sys-
tem. First, the existing system is flawed by its failure to include social
security payments as gross income. The rationale of the existing system
is not based on the grounds that social security payments are not income,
but rather that these payments should be tax free. The better view is that
109. For survey data on American attitudes towards social security, see R. COUGHLIN, supra
note 25, at 57-60.
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such payments should be tax free only to the extent of the minimum
wage and, thus, offset by a personal exemption in the same amount. 1 °
It can also be argued that the social security benefit should be
designed as a part of the minimum wage. The social security payment,
like the minimum wage, is earned by working, and the amount of the
benefit is not based on a market valuation of the social product produced
by the recipient. Instead, the social security benefit is the basic share to
which all workers in society are morally entitled on retirement as a result
of their participation in the work force. So viewed, the social security
benefit can be described as the deferred portion of each individual's cur-
rent income. It is a part of the minimum wage guaranteed by society to
each productive individual."1 ' Presumably, then, the minimum wage and
the social security benefit should be equal in amount. It will also be
remembered that nonworking spouses are valuable participants in the
productive life of society as evidenced by the imputed income from
household work. For the same reasons that make it appropriate to tax
nonworking spouses on their imputed minimum wage incomes, a social
security benefit equal to the minimum wage ought to be extended to non-
working spouses. 11
2
This analysis further suggests that the social security tax should be
integrated with the income tax. Retirement is a current drain on society,
not a future drain. The claims of retirees, though earned in the past,
must be satisfied with currently produced goods, which must be
purchased with current funds. These funds must be obtained by a tax on
current incomes. Moreover, social security benefits constitute a public
good available to each citizen on retirement. These benefits are a product
of the public service time owed to society by each working citizen. The
revenues needed to provide this public good should be raised, then, by a
fiat rate comprehensive income tax allowing a personal exemption equal
to the minimum wage. 3 This is so because (1) the tax extracted under
110. The Social Security Amendments of 1983, enacted April 20, 1983, added I.R.C. § 86,
which is effective with respect to social security benefits received after December 31, 1983. Section 86
includes in gross income up to half of the social security benefits received by individuals with ad-
justed gross incomes in excess of $25,000 and married individuals with adjusted gross incomes in
excess of $32,000. Social Security Amendments of 1983, Pub. L. No. 98-21, 97 Stat. 65 (1983).
Prior to the enactment of section 86 social security benefits were not taxed.
111. Presumably a rational social security program would define a "productive worker" as one
who has been employed at the minimum wage for the requisite number of years.
112. See supra notes 37-44 and accompanying text.
113. The same analysis applies to unemployment compensation. Unemployment compensation
is earned by the employee in the same manner as social security benefits and should, therefore, equal
the minimum wage. Likewise, unemployment benefits should be protected from federal taxation by
a personal exemption equal to the minimum wage. Interestingly, unemployment benefits, like social
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such a regime constitutes a proxy for the public service time owed by the
taxpayer, and (2) such a regime will extract taxes only from gross in-
comes in excess of the minimum wage, thus protecting a retiree's moral
entitlement to the portion of gross income representing his or her social
security benefit.
The present social security tax can, accordingly, be criticized on
four significant points. First, it fails to exempt from tax earnings below
the minimum wage. Second, not all workers are subject to the tax. 114
Third, it exempts from tax, wages above a maximum level.' 15 Fourth, it
excludes nonwage income from the definition of taxable income.116 In
other words, the social security tax is a regressive income tax, inferior in
design according to the basic tenets of post-liberal society.
B. A LOOK AT CURRENT FIGURES
The implications of the foregoing analysis become clear when the
present tax treatment of minimum wage workers is compared with the
type of flat rate comprehensive income tax advocated in this Article.
Based on a forty hour work week with fifty-two weeks' pay per year as
the norm in our society, the present annual gross income of full-time
minimum wage workers is $6968.117 The figure that will appear on the
minimum wage worker's W-2 form is $6968. However, the actual guar-
anteed minimum wage must be adjusted to reflect social security taxes
paid by the employer. These taxes are a cost to the employer to the same
extent as payments labeled "wages" on an employee's W-2 form, and
affect the employer's determination of how many workers can be em-
ployed profitably. Put another way, every dollar the employer must pay
in social security tax reduces dollar for dollar the wages the employer
will willingly pay the employee. 118 For a worker employed at the stated
security benefits, are excluded from gross income as a matter of administrative grace. I.T. 3230,
1938-2 C.B. 136. Also paralleling the treatment of social security payments, see supra note 110,
unemployment compensation is taxed if adjusted gross income exceeds a base amount-S12,000 for
individuals and $18,000 for joint returns. I.R.C. § 85 (1982).
114. 42 U.S.C. § 410(a) (1976). The Social Security Amendments of 1983, supra note 110, sub-
stantially narrowed the exclusions from coverage.
115. I.R.C. § 3121(a)(1) (1982); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1047, 404.1048 (1984).
116. See I.R.C. § 3121(a) (1982). Only wages are treated as taxable income. Thus the social
security tax is imposed on a base that excludes realized gains from the disposition of property, wind-
fall gains, and periodic return on capital.
117. The current minimum wage is $3.35 per hour. 29 U.S.C. § 206(a) (1983).
118. See Brittain, The Incidence of Social Security Payroll Taxes, 61 AM. EcON. REV. 110,
passim (1971); Kotlikoff, Social Security, Time for Reform, in FEDERAL TAX REFORM: MYTHS &
REALITIES 122, 123 (M. Boskin ed. 1978) (virtually unanimous agreement among economists that
burden of social security tax is borne solely by the employee).
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annual minimum wage of $6968, the employer pays $466.86 in social
security taxes. 119 Because the employee bears the actual burden of this
employer-paid tax, the true pretax value of the minimum wage is
$7434.86-the sum of the stated minimum wage and the social security
taxes paid by the employer.
The post-liberal ideal would be to integrate the present income tax
and social security tax into one flat rate comprehensive income tax al-
lowing a personal exemption equal to the true minimum wage. Chart X
compares the tax treatment of three individuals under both the present
and the post-liberal ideal. A is an unmarried minimum wage worker, and
B and C are a married couple, each earning the minimum wage.
CHART X
B&C, B&C
A, Present A, Post-Liberal Present Post-Liberal
System Ideal System Ideal
Real Gross Income $7,434.86 $7,434.86 $14,869.72 $14,869.72
FICA Tax120  933.71 0 1,867.42 0
Income Tax121  462.00 0 1,089.00 0
After-Tax Income 6,039.15 7,434.86 11,913.30 14,869.72
These figures suggest that minimum wage workers, whether married
or single, are currently overtaxed to a significant degree. Implementing
the post-liberal ideal without an increase in the minimum amount that an
employer would be required to expend on each employee would result in
nearly a 25% increase in disposable income-an increase of over $100
119. I.R.C. § 3101(a)(5) (1982) imposes on every employer an excise tax of 5.40% of the cov-
ered wages of an employee for Old Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance ("OASI"). I.R.C.
§ 3101(b)(4) imposes on every employer an excise tax of 1.30% of the covered wages of an employer
for Hospital Insurance. Though it could be argued that these taxes are separate, with only the
former related to the provision of the retirement benefit guaranteed by post-liberal society, I take the
contrary view. Thus, the social security tax in this Article is the combined OASI and Hospital
Insurance levy of 6.70%.
120. I.R.C. § 3101(a)-(b) imposes a social security tax of 6.70% on the employee. Thus, the
combined social security tax paid by employer and employee is 13.40% of gross wages. Recall that
gross wages are calculated based on $3.35 per hour, 40 hours per week, and a 52 week year. See
supra note 117 and accompanying text. They do not include the employer social security
contribution.
121. Income tax liability is computed under I.R.C. § 3 (1982) (tax tables prescribed by the
Secretary of the Treasury applicable to unmarried individuals and married individuals filing jointly
for tax year 1984). With respect to the present income tax it is assumed that 4, B, and C are each
entitled to a $1000 personal exemption under I.R.C. § 151(b) (1982), but to no other deductions or
credits. With respect to the post-liberal ideal it is assumed that the gross income of the minimum
wage worker is offset by a personal exemption equal to the minimum wage.
[Vol. 58:727
HeinOnline -- 58 S. Cal. L. Rev. 774 1985
PROGRESSIVE FLAT RATE TAX
per month-for each minimum wage recipient. Such an increase in dis-
posable income would have a significant impact on the material well be-
ing of the minimum wage earner. The required modifications of our
federal income tax and social security systems are consistent with the
beliefs of post-liberal society. Publicizing this fact could make possible
the mobilization of a sufficiently powerful political force to accomplish
the suggested modifications. However, lower income citizens must first
perceive their common interest in, and entitlement to, these changes.
The ultimate purpose of the foregoing critique is to provide a rational
and convincing basis for such perceptions.
CONCLUSION
Our society reveres the myth of individualism-the view that each
citizen is autonomous and through independent effort can carve out a
happy, meaningful life. From this perspective, an income tax levied at
graduated rates seems unfair-a penalty for the very success that we all
seek and applaud. On the other hand, it is apparent that many above
average incomes are the result of market imperfections, inherited wealth,
or other unfair advantages. At the same time, our society is committed
to providing a minimal level of goods and services to those who are dis-
advantaged. These conflicting perceptions form the basis of our individ-
ual and societal beliefs about the nature and extent of each individual's
entitlement to income and the proper structure of our income tax.
In this Article, I have argued that a flat rate comprehensive income
tax allowing a personal exemption equal to either the annual minimum
wage or the taxpayer's earned income, whichever is less, is both progres-
sive and consistent with our governing beliefs. It is consistent with our
governing ideology to view society as a cooperative venture in which
equal citizens have joined for mutual advantage. As a part of this ideol-
ogy, each citizen would agree to contribute equal time to the creation of
public goods. Each citizen, however, would retain a claim to the prod-
ucts or services that he or she produces during time not devoted to public
service.
A fiat rate tax extracts taxes that represent the value of the public
service time owed to society by each citizen. A personal exemption equal
to the minimum wage acknowledges each working citizen's moral claim
to a base portion of the social product. Presumptively, this base share
represents the value that the market will attach to all services performed
by those without scarce talents. So viewed, the minimum wage is the
proper measure of-he imputed income received by nonworking spouses
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for household services performed. Moreover, limiting the personal ex-
emption to the lesser of the minimum wage or a taxpayer's earned in-
come has the effect of imputing leisure income to those who do not work,
but instead are supported by unearned income. Thus, a progressive flat
rate tax properly identifies the after-tax income to which each working
citizen is morally entitled. In so doing, it produces fair tax burdens be-
tween married and unmarried individuals living alone or with others.
Additionally, I have shown that the minimum wage, the personal
exemption, and the provision of social security benefits can be under-
stood as responses to related beliefs and concerns of post-liberal citizens.
Viewed in this manner, the case for integrating the social security tax
with a progressive flat rate tax seems compelling.
Finally, I have suggested that a flat rate comprehensive income tax
has more potential for achieving progressive change than our present
graduated tax. The advantage of the progressive flat rate tax described is
its theoretical ability to unite low income workers in a common quest for
an increased minimum wage and personal exemption. Linking the mini-
mum wage and the personal exemption under a flat rate tax identifies a
plausible route to achieving greater shares of after-tax income for low
income taxpayers. Moreover, understanding the governing ideological
rationale of society enables us to explain why low income workers should
view this quest as just. It is in terms of this potential for achieving
needed progressive change that a flat rate comprehensive income tax
must ultimately be evaluated by progressive scholars and citizens.
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